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STATE V. MANN: EXTRANEOUS PREJUDICIAL
INFORMATION IN THE JURY ROOM:
BEAUTIFUL MINDS ALLOWED*
SHARON BLANCHARD HAWK**
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the New Mexico Supreme Court announced, in State v. Sacoman,' that
ajuror's reliance on personal knowledge to deliberate on the facts of the case gives
rise to extraneous information that could prejudice a jury.2 In 2002, the New
4
Mexico Supreme Court, in State v. Mann,3 narrowed this overly broad statement
by concluding that a juror may indeed rely on personal knowledge and expertise
during jury deliberations,5 so long as the juror's knowledge and expertise are not
material to the particular case.6 In doing so, the Mann court limited a party's ability
to challenge a verdict under New Mexico Rule 11-606(B). 7 Consequently, the Mann
opinion raises the issue of whether the resultant limitation is appropriate given the
tension between the need for jurors to freely deliberate and a party's right to a fair
trial.8
This note evaluates the status of Rule 11-606(B) following State v. Mann. It
begins with a statement of the case outlining the factual and procedural issues that
brought Mann before the New Mexico Supreme Court.' The next section provides
the historical context in which to place the Mann decision by outlining relevant
state law, as well as the federal law on which New Mexico Rule 11-606(B) is
premised.' ° In particular, the background section focuses on the policy considerations underpinning the federal rule and adopted by New Mexico courts. In light of
the Mann court's rationale, " the decision is then analyzed 2 against the New Mexico
Supreme Court's earlier decision in State v. Sacoman and borrowed rationale from

* See generally SYLVIA NASAR, A BEAUTIFUL MIND: THE LIFE OF MATHEMATICAL GENIUS AND NOBEL
LAUREATE JOHN NASH (1998).
** Class of 2004, University of New Mexico School of Law. My gratitude to the following: my husband
and son for their understanding and resilience; my dearest friend, Johanna Astle, for her strong shoulders and sound
advice; my faculty advisors, Professor Ted Occhialino and Professor Barbara Bergman, for their guidance and
support; and my editors, Mariposa Padilla-Sivage and Catherine Ava Begaye, for their skillful oversight and
patience. Further, I would like to acknowledge my friends-the paramedics, nurses, and physicians-whose lives
were changed forever when they could not save this little boy's life.
1. 107 N.M. 588, 590, 762 P.2d 250, 252 (1988) ("Communication of specific knowledge from a
particular juror to others involves extraneous information.").
2. Id.
3. 2002-NMSC-001, 39 P.3d 124.
4. Id. 1 24, 39 P.3d at 130-31 (characterizing the Sacoman court's "broad introductory statement" as
"sweeping and far-reaching" and determining that it is "not a particularly helpful test in extraneous information
cases").

5. Id. 38, 39 P.3d at 136.
6. Id. 24, 39 P.3d at 130-31 (distinguishing the facts in this case from circumstances where jurors have
"specific knowledge of extrajudicial facts directly related to the litigation before them").
7. Rule 11-606(B) NMRA 2004.
8. See infra Part 111.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part IM.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
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State v. Chamberlain.13 The final section explores the implications of the Mann
decision for future requests for new trials on a claim that a juror tainted the verdict
by introducing extraneous information to other4 members of the jury while
deliberating within the sanctity of the jury room.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The facts of this case are very sad. They begin with a six-year-old boy caught in
the crossfire between feuding divorced parents 5 and end with the conviction of a
father for the murder of his son. 6 In the shared custody arrangement, the boy
primarily lived with his mother and would stay at his father's home every other
weekend. 7 It was during one of these weekend visits with his father that this child's
life came to its tragic end."8
At trial, the defendant father, Mark William Mann, testified that he awoke his
son at 1:00 A.M. to walk him to the bathroom, because he had forgotten to do so
earlier. 9 Mann stated that while standing at the bathroom door, he saw his son "'trip
on a rug, put out his arms and knock the items on the hamper, and then fall to the
floor." 2 0 The defendant further testified that when he turned his son onto his back,
he saw a screwdriver protruding from his six-year-old's chest.2
The defendant introduced the expert testimony of physicist Dr. Alan Watts concerning the likelihood "of the victim impaling himself on the screwdriver consistent
with" the defendant's explanation.22 Dr. Watts completed several courtroom calculations regarding "the angle at which the screwdriver may have landed and the
amount of force which the victim's body would have exerted upon it on impact."23
Dr. Watts testified that, because the likelihood of impalement in the manner
described by the defendant was "'relatively small"' given the facts, he characterized
the occurrence as a "'freakish accident."' 2 4 Dr. Watts went on to describe this characterization as a "'probability calculation"' because it was "'basically [a] roll [of]
the dice.', 2 Further, on cross-examination, Dr. Watts provided his expert opinion
that the probability of an accidental impalement consistent with the defendant's
theory was "'finite' but 'never zero."'26

13. 112 N.M. 723, 819 P.2d 673 (1991).
14. See infra Part VI.
15. On the night he died, the child was sleeping at his father's house when his parents engaged in a
telephone argument regarding the length of this particular visit and late child support payments. Mann, 2002NMSC-001, 2, 39 P.3d at 125.
16. Id. -H 1, 9, 39 P.3d at 125, 127. The Defendant was convicted of "child abuse resulting in death and
second degree murder." Id. 9, 39 P.3d at 127.
17. Id. 2, 39 P.3d at 125.
18. Id. IN 2-4, 39 P.3d at 125-26.
19. Id. 6, 39 P.3d at 126.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. 7, 39 P.3d at 126.
23. Id. Additionally, he "performed both in-court and videotaped demonstrations" for the jury that involved
dropping a screwdriver and simulated body onto the floor. Id. In 7, 29, 39 P.3d at 126, 133.
24. Id. (quoting Dr. Watts).
25. Id. 17, 39 P.3d at 126-27.
26. Id. U 8, 29, 39 P.3d at 127, 133.
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Following the trial, defense counsel interviewed several jurors and was told that
during jury deliberations, Juror 7 introduced probability calculations regarding the
chances of a child impaling himself on the screwdriver consistent with the
defendant's testimony." Claiming "that the verdict was tainted by [J]uror [7's]
misconduct,"2 8 defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial on the basis that Juror
7, by relying on his expertise as an engineer and his knowledge of physics to
calculate his own probabilities, had discredited the defendant's expert witness and
brought extraneous prejudicial material before thejury 9 The trial court conducted
in camera3" interviews3' with jury members 4,32 6," 7, 9,34 and 10"5to determine the
need for a full evidentiary hearing requiring juror testimony under Rule 1606(B). 36
Juror 7 denied performing any experiments or calculations at home37 but
acknowledged that, "beginning with Dr. Watts' calculations" presented at trial, he
conducted a probability calculation during deliberations to "'verify [his] own gut
feeling."' 38 Juror 7 reported that "he used his 'professional judgment' and a 'fairly
simple five-step probability' calculation" using five events 39 from the defendant's
description of the incident.40 Juror 7 further reported that "he did not dispute or
discredit Dr. Watts' testimony"; rather, he stated that it "consisted of 'fine
calculations"' with which he, Juror 7, agreed.4 ' However, he also Stated that "he did
not accept the 'logical tie"' between Dr. Watts' testimony and the defendant's

27. Id. 1 10, 39 P.3d at 127.
28. Id. U 1, 10, 39 P.3d at 125, 127.
29. State v. Mann, 2000-NMCA-088,1 28, 11 P.3d 564, 573, cert.granted,129 N.M. 99 (2000), anda'd,
2002-NMSC-001.
30. "In camera" is defined as occurring in a judge's private chambers or in a courtroom outside of the
presence of any spectators. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 763 (7th ed. 1999);
31. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 1 11, 39 P.3d at 127.
32. Juror 4 reported that Juror 7 "'didn't say he did any experiments at home' and that '[h]e didn't bring
papers' into the jury room, but used the easel in the room." Id. 113, 39 P.3d at 127. Additionally, Juror 4 reported,
"Juror 7 said, 'Let's take Dr. Watts' figures."' Id.
33. Juror 6 said, "'Ifeel that.. theengineerjuror... wasjust.. .venting his feelings and thoughts and emotions
during the deliberation."' Id.
34. Juror 9 reported that "Juror 7 wrote 'some calculations' on a board in the jury room." Id. 12, 39 P.3d
at 127.
35. Juror 10 reported that "Juror 7 had some 'figures that he had thought about and it was explaining his
point of view on the testimony of Dr. Watts."' Id. 13, 39 P.3d at 127.
36. Rule 11-606(B) NMRA 2004.
37. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 14, 39 P.3d at 127.
38. Id. 1 14, 39 P.3d at 127-28. The fact that Juror 7 did not perform his calculations at home was
determinative in the court's mind. See infra Parts M, IV, and V. However, it is important to note that the
appropriateness of his calculations was not location driven; Rather, the appropriateness of any testing of the
veracity of evidence hinges upon whether the conduct occurs within the protection of the trial process. Mann, 2002NMSC-001, 14, 39 P.3d at 127-28.
39. "[Flirst, whether 'the screwdriver land[ed]'...perpendicular to the victim's falling body; second, whether
the screwdriver landed with the blade facing up; third, whether the screwdriver separated itself, as it fell, from other
items that had been knocked off the hamper; fourth, where it landed on the floor; and fifth, whether its orientation
caused the wound path." Juror 7 "'multiplied the numbers, one over 10 times one over two times 1 over 100 three
times, and the number you get is basically five times ten to minus 8 or in what most of us think about, one in a 20
million chance."' Id. 1 14, 39 P.3d at 128.
40. Id. 14, 39 P.3d at 127-28.
41. Id. 14, 39 P.3d at 127.
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story.42 As a result of the in camera interviews, the trial court determined that the
defendant failed to show that extraneous information had reached the jury"3 and
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to require further inquiry into the
jury's conduct or to set aside the verdict. 4
The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the
issue of juror misconduct and concluded "that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying the [d]efendant's motion for a new trial.""5 On certiorari, the
New Mexico Supreme Court also rejected the defendant's argument that he was
entitled to a new trial based on Juror 7's misconduct"6 and affirmed the New
Mexico Court of Appeal's determination that the trial court acted within its
discretion with respect to the defendant's motion for a new trial."7 Thus, the New
Mexico Supreme Court held that "ajuror may properly rely on his or her education,
experience and common sense during deliberations; thorough discussion, informed
by expertise and based on evidence at trial, does not constitute extraneous
prejudicial information." 41 Such information is considered a "juror's mental
process[]" and is not "properly the subject of juror testimony.""

m. BACKGROUND
The primary concern in cases involving extraneous prejudicial information is a
party's right to due process. 0 A component of due process includes a defendant's
right to a fair and impartial jury.5" A fair and impartial jury requires that jurors
decide the case solely on the evidence presented to them in open court.52 Any new
evidence, presented out of the presence of the parties, is considered "extrinsic"
information that may prejudice the jury.53 Extrinsic information is prejudicial and,
therefore, grounds for impeaching a verdict when the information is both material
to the verdict and the jury's consideration of the information violates a party's due

42. Id. 14, 39 P.3d at 127-28.
43. Id. 11, 16,39 P.3d at 127, 128.
44. Id.
45. Id. See also State v. Mann, 2000-NMCA-088, TI 108-09, 11 P.3d 564, 589, cert. granted, 129 N.M.
99 (2000), and af'd, 2002-NMSC-001, 39 P.3d 124 (concluding that "the district court did not act contrary to
logic and reason in ruling that the jury based its verdict solely upon the evidence adduced at trial and their own,
individual consciences").
46. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 1 1, 39 P.3d at 125.
47. Id. 38, 39 P.3d at 136.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739 (1993) (stating that the ultimate inquiry when an
improper influence reaches the jury is whether the influence affects thejury's deliberations and thereby its verdict).
51. Rule 11-606(B) applies in both criminal and civil cases tried before a jury. In either case, the underlying
principle in cases involving extraneous prejudicial information is a party's right to a just result. See JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL, STUDENT EDITION § 11.04[3], at 11-10

(4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN & BERGER, STUDENT EDITION] (Federal Rule 606(b) "seeks to reach an
accommodation between policies designed to safeguard the institution of trial by jury and policies designed to
insure a just result in the individual case.").
52. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,217 (1982). See also 25 JAMES WM. MOORE ETAL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 624.72[l], at 624-96 (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter 25 MOORE ET AL.]; Annotation, Proprietyof Juror's
Tests or Experiments in Jury Room, 31 A.L.R. 4th 566 (1984).
53. See 25 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, § 624.72[1], at 624-96. See generally Annotation, supranote 52,
§ 566[2a].
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process rights.5 4 A party's due process rights are said to be violated when the party
is deprived "of the 'opportunity to conduct cross-examination, offer evidence in
rebuttal, argue the significance of the information to the jury, or request a curative
instruction."' 5 5 A presumption of prejudice arises when the party seeking a new trial
on the basis of extraneous information makes a preliminary showing that the
information actually reached the jury.56 This presumption is rebutted, however, if
the court finds that there was no "reasonable possibility" that the verdict was
affected by the extraneous information.57
New Mexico Rule of Evidence 11-606(B) governs5 8a juror's ability to testify
59
about whether extraneous information reached the jury. Rooted in common law
and patterned after Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 6° New Mexico Rule 11-606(B)
provides that
a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course
of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent or dissent from the
verdict... except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was improperlybroughtto bearupon anyjuror.6 1

New Mexico Rule of Evidence 11-606(B) reflects the federal policy discouraging
intrusion into jury deliberations by limiting the use of juror testimony to impeach
a jury verdict.62 This protection extends to "each component of deliberation
including arguments, statements, discussions, mental and emotional reactions,
votes, and any other feature of the process., 63 This policy is founded upon the

54. 25 MOOREETAL., supra note 52, § 624.72[1], at 624-96; State v. Doe, 101 N.M. 363, 366, 683 P.2d
45, 48 (1984). See also Rernmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).
55. 25 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, § 624.72[l], at 624-96 (quoting United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d
877, 884 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962 (1982)).
56. Doe, 101 N.M. at 366,683 P.2d at 48. See also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229; 25 MOORE ET AL., supra note
52, § 624.73[2][a], at 624-109 ("In determining whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial, the proper inquiry
is whether a reasonable possibility exists that the extrinsic evidence could have affected the verdict.").
57. State v. Sacoman, 107 N.M. 588, 591, 762 P.2d 250, 253 (1988) (citing Doe, 101 N.M. at 366, 683
P.2d at 48; State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 123, 692 P.2d 45, 48 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984)). See also 25 MOORE ET
AL., supra note 52, § 624.73[2][a], at 624-109 ("In determining whether the defendant is entitled to anew trial, the
proper inquiry is whether a reasonable possibility exists that the extrinsic evidence could have affected the
verdict.").
58. Rule 11-606(B) NMRA 2004.
59. Rios v. Danuser Mach. Co., Inc., 110 N.M. 87, 90, 792 P.2d 419, 422 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (citing
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987)).
60. See id. at 90, 792 P.2d at 422 ("Our Rule 11-606(B) is identical to Rule 606(b) adopted by
Congress....").
61. Rule 11-606(B) NMRA 2004 (emphasis added).
62. See Rios, 110 N.M. at 90, 792 P.2d at 422 (noting that "Congress intended to preclude juror testimony
concerning matters or statements of jurors during jury deliberations"). See also State v. Chamberlain, 112 N.M.
723, 731, 819 P.2d 673, 681 (1991) ("We agree with the policy that discourages, and in most instances prohibits,
any inquiry or intrusion into the jury room.") (citing State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 612, 566 P.2d 1146, 1150
(1977)). See also Duran v. Lovato, 99 N.M. 242, 247, 656 P.2d 905, 910 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) ("It is well settled
that a juror may not impeach the verdict as to matters that inhere therein after the jury has been discharged.")
(quoting Blake v. Cich, 79 F.R.D. 398 (D. Minn. 1978)); FED. R. EvD. 606(b) advisory committee's note; 26
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 631.21[1], at 631-58 (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter 26
MOORE ET AL.].
63. FED. R. Evil. 606(b) advisory committee's note.
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interests of ensuring full and open debate, insulating the deliberation process from
extrinsic pressures, protecting jurors from harassment, and securing the stability of
the system and the finality of verdicts.' If, however, a party can objectively show
that the verdict was tainted by extraneous information, the trial court has a duty to
inquire into the possibility65 and, when appropriate,66 conduct an evidentiary
hearing.67
Although New Mexico law makes no formal distinction between civil and
criminal parties who seek a remedy under Rule 11-606(B),68 there is suggestion
within the federal domain that the rights of a criminal defendant "may require
inquiry into the circumstances regarding a jury's deliberation regardless of the
jurisdiction's rule on impeachment by jurors., 69 However, review of federal law
fails to yield any support for this suggestion. To the contrary, the policies
underpinning Federal Rule 606(b),7" as well as the body of federal common law
addressing this rule,7 show that ajuror remains competent to testify about improper
influences, even if it is a criminal defendant who brings a complaint under Federal
Rule 606(b).
Because New Mexico Rule 11-606(B) and Federal Rule 606(b) are identical,
an understanding of the federal rule further informs the discussion of the New
Mexico rule. Federal Rule 606(b) seeks to reach a balance between policies
intended to protect the jury deliberation process and policies intended to yield ajust
result.73 It does so by drawing a dividing line between inquiries into the jurors'
internal thought processes and the existence of external events meant to improperly

64. Rule 11-606 NMRA 2004 (The compilers observe in their annotations that every verdict would invite
harassment if the mental operations and emotional reactions of jurors in arriving at a given result were the
permissible subject of inquiry); Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARV. L. REv. 886, 888-92
(1983). See also FED. R. EvID. 606(b) advisory committee's note; 26 MOORE ET AL., supra note 62, § 631.21 [1],
at 631-158.
65. Doe, 101 N.M. at 366, 683 P.2d at 48 (citing Durr v. Cook, 589 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1979)).
66. The trial court is allowed discretion in the manner by which it inquires into an allegation that the jury
verdict was tainted by extraneous prejudicial information and its decision will not be overturned absent abuse of
that discretion. Mann, 2000-NMCA-088, 67, 11 P.3d at 580, cert. granted, 129 N.M. 99 (2000), andaff'd, 2002NMSC-001, 39 P.3d 124 (relying on State v. Sacoman, 107 N.M. 588, 592, 762 P.2d 250, 254 (1988)).
67. Doe, 101 N.M. at 366, 683 P.2d at 48 (citing Durr, 589 F.2d 891).
68. N.M. CONST. art. U,§ 14; State v. Verdugo, 78 N.M. 762,438 P.2d 172 (1968) (articulating a criminal's
due process rights under New Mexico's constitution without reference to broader protections); CHUCK SMITH, THE
NEW MEXICO STATE CONSTITUTION, A REFERENCE GUIDE 40-42 (1996) (without reference to increased

protections under New Mexico's constitution as compared to the federal constitution).
69. See 3 JACKB. WEINSTEIN &MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL, § 606.04[2] [d],
at 606-20 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, EVIDENCE MANUAL]
(citing Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966) (emphasis added)).
70. See FED. R. EviD. 606(b) advisory committee's note; Rule 11-606 NMRA 2004 compiler's annotations.
The compilers observe that every verdict would invite harassment if the "mental operations and emotional reactions
of jurors in arriving at a given result" were the permissible subject of inquiry. See also Note, Public Disclosures
of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARv. L. REv. 886, 888-92 (1983); 26 MOORE ET AL., supra note 62, § 631.21[1], at
631-58.
71. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892) ("It is vital in capital cases that the jury
should pass upon the case free from external causes tending to disturb the exercise of deliberate and unbiased
judgment.") (emphasis added). See also 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 78, §
606.04[2][d], at 606-20 and cases cited therein.
72. See Rio, 110 N.M. at 90,792 P.2d at 422 ("Our Rule 11-606(B) is identical to Rule 606(b) adopted by
Congress.").
73. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, STUDENT EDMON, supra note 51, § 11.04[3].
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influence the verdict.74 Thus, the inquiry relies on "an external/internal7 5distinction
to determine whenjuror testimony impeaching a verdict is permissible." On which
76
side of the line an influence falls is not always clear. However, some rules have
emerged to assist jurists in this determination.
Inquiry into "the jurors' beliefs, opinions, discussions, or grounds is regarded as
inquiry into internal influences and is forbidden except as necessary to determine
with the
the existence and content of any unauthorized communication or contact
7 7 On the other hand, inquiries into the existence of juror bias,78 juror misconjury."
80
duct,79 unauthorized third-party contacts with jurors, and consideration of
81
improper evidence are permissible, because they are regarded as improper external
influences on the jury. 82 External influences on the jury may be grounds for
impeachment of a verdict when the improper influence is material to the verdict and
83
the jury's consideration of the improper evidence deprives a party of ajust result.
Until 1988, New Mexico courts had decided that a juror's conduct while
deliberating in the jury room on evidence properly presented in open court falls
ajuror
under the category of the proper internal function of the jury, thus rendering
85 however, the
Sacoman,
v.
State
In
1
1-606(B).'
Rule
under
testify
to
incompetent
86
New Mexico Supreme Court diverged from this long held rule by penning into the
87
opinion a broader version of the old rule. While the Sacoman court purported to

74. See id.
75. 26 MOORE ETAL., supra note 62, § 631.21[1], at 631-58.
76. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, STUDENT EDITION, supra note 51, § 11.04[3], at 11-11.

77. 26 MOORE ET AL., supranote 62, § 631.21 [1], at 631-58 ("Any inquiry into the jurors' beliefs, opinions,
discussions, or grounds is considered an inquiry into internal influences....").
78. Bias is defined as an "[i]nclination" or "prejudice." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 66 (7th ed. 1999).
Cases involving juror bias are distinguishable from those involving juror misconduct. See Mann, 2002-NMSC-001
(juror
25, 39 P.3d at 131. See also WEINSTEIN &BERGER, STUDENTEDITION, supra note 51, § 11.04[3], at 11-15
tending
as
but
606(b),
rule
by
prohibited
not
are
they
because
not
admissible
be
"may
bias
indicating
statements
to prove that the juror lied on the voir dire, a separate question from that of impeachment of verdicts").
See BLACK'S
79. Juror misconduct is defined as "[a] juror's violation of the court's charge or the law...."
LAW DICTIONARY 450 (7th ed. 1999).
80. 25 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, § 624.72[2], at 624-98 ("The quintessential example of an ex parte
not
contact is a threat, bribe, or statement containing prejudicial information made directly to ajuror by.. .someone
connected with the case....").
81. 25 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, § 624.721l], at 624-96 ("Jurors have a duty to consider only the
evidence which is presented to them in open court.").
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Compare State v. Sena, 105 N.M. 686,687-88,736 P.2d 491,492-93 (1987) (holding that juror's stateto
ment other jurors that "he knew defendant was guilty, but that he could not base his conviction on anything he
heard in the courtroom" alone was insufficient to indicate that extraneous information reached the jury); State v.
Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 123, 692 P.2d 45, 48 (1984) (jury's use ofa dictionary, when their request to use such was
expressly denied by the court, amounted to extraneous information); State v. Doe, 101 N.M. 363, 683 P.2d 45
(1983) (holding that an account of witness intimidation, not presented at trial, was extraneous prejudicial information because it reached the jury); State v. Dascenzo, 30 N.M. 34,36-37,226 P. 1099,2001-02 (1924) (determining
that the jurors' act of smelling the contents of a liquor bottle that was properly admitted in evidence did not create
new evidentiary facts); with State v. Sacoman, 107 N.M. 588, 591,762 p.2d 250,253 (1988) (holding that ajuror's
statement made during deliberations regarding his personal expertise as a busboy constituted extraneous prejudicial
information).
85. 107 N.M. 588, 590, 762 P.2d 250, 252 (1988).
86. See Dascenzo, 30 N.M. at 36-37, 226 P. at 2001-02.
87. See Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 590, 762 P.2d at 252 (quoting People v. Huntley, 87 A.D.2d 488,492,452
N.Y.S.2d 952, 955 (N.Y. 1982) ("jurors are not precluded from drawing on their wisdom and experience and
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support the long standing notion that jurors may draw on their knowledge and
expertise when deliberating on facts screened through the trial process, 88 it deviated
from prior precedent when it categorized "[c]ommunication of specific knowledge
from a particular juror to others' 89 as an improper external influence. In doing so,
the Sacoman court lowered the bar for what gives rise to a presumption of prejudice
and, therefore, expanded the rights of a party to invoke Rule 11-606(B) on a claim
that extraneous information reached the jury.'
The Mann court analyzed two lines of cases in determining whether Juror 7's
conduct exposed the jury to extraneous prejudicial information: first, cases
involving jury experimentation in the jury room91 and, second, cases involving a
juror's reliance on personal knowledge and expertise.92 Although, arguably, these
two lines of cases are distinguishable, a broader view shows that both types of cases
simply involve the weighing of evidence. A concern of New Mexico courts when
addressing the issue of whether a verdict was tainted by extraneous information is
whether, in its effort to weigh the evidence,93 a jury deliberates on new facts, rather
than on facts properly screened by the trialprocess.94 Even though New Mexico

engaging in a free exchange of ideas and subjective opinions during the course of their deliberations. * *** The
point, however, is that such deliberations must take their content from the record facts before them, not from
external facts brought into the jury room by a juror and thus not screened through the judicial process")). The
Sacoman court went on to add, "Communication of specific knowledge from a particular juror to others involves
extraneous information." Id.
88. This qualifier, screened through the trial process, indicates that the facts considered by the jury in
reaching a verdict, need not be limited to facts formally admitted into evidence. Implicit in the holdings are that
facts protected by the trial process include all information presented to the jurors and allowed by the court for them
to consider in reaching a just verdict.
89. Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 590, 762 P.2d at 252.
90. See Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 590,762 P.2d at 252 (quoting People v. Huntley, 87 A.D.2d 488,492,452,
N.Y.S.2d 952, 955 (N.Y. 1982) ("jurors are not precluded from drawing on their wisdom and experience and
engaging in a free exchange of ideas and subjective opinions during the course of their deliberations. * *** The
point, however, is that such deliberations must take their content from the record facts before them, not from
external facts brought into the jury room by a juror and thus not screened through the judicial process"). The
Sacoman court went on to add, "Communication of specific knowledge from a particular juror to others involves
extraneous information." Id.
91. See, e.g., Chamberlain, 112 N.M. 723, 819 P.2d 673 (juror experimentation with a gun, holster, and
audio-tape, all of which were properly introduced into evidence); Dascenzo, 30 N.M. 34, 226 P. 1099 (juror
analysis of contents of a bottle properly introduced into evidence).
92. The Mann court focused its analysis on Sacoman because, in addition to being leading precedent, the
defendant, in his defense, relied on the Sacoman court's broad introductory statement that "'[c]ommunication of
specific knowledge from a particular juror to others involves extraneous information."' See Mann, 2002-NMSC001, 24, 39 P.3d at 130; see also Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 590, 762 P.2d at 252 (juror relied on his personal busboy
experience to inform his deliberations); Hurst v. Citadel, Ltd., Ill N.M. 566, 568, 807 P.2d 750, 752 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1991) (in a negligence case, one juror's statement to the jury that her "father had been involved in
a[n]... accident and was forced to take sole responsibility for his injury" did not constitute extraneous prejudicial
information).
93. See Dascenzo, 30 N.M. at 36-37, 226 P. at 1100 ("When physical things are introduced in evidence,
jurors are permitted to look at them, to decide what they think concerning them....By so doing, the juror did not
gain independent evidence upon which to reach his conclusion, butsimply testedthe evidence alreadyintroduced,
in order to properly determine its truth orprobative value.") (emphasis added).
94. See Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 732, 819 P.2d at 682 (noting that the jury did not consider evidence not
properly introduced at trial and analogizing the facts); Dascenzo, 30 N.M. at 36-37, 226 P. at 1100 (concluding
that thejurors' independent analysis of the contents of a bottle allegedly containing liquor did not create new facts);
Sacoman, 107 N.M. 588, 762 P.2d 250 (concluding that although jurors may draw from their knowledge and
experience when deliberating, they must confine their deliberations to evidence properly admitted at trial and not
from external facts brought into the deliberations by a juror).
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courts have not agreed on what constitutes a new fact versus one that is properly
screened by the trial process,95 New Mexico courts, including the Sacoman court,
have agreed that extraneous prejudicial information results when jurors deliberate
on facts not properly presented at trial.96
The issue of whether jurors deliberated on new facts rather than those protected
98
9
by the trial process first surfaced in New Mexico in 1924. ' In State v. Dascenzo,
the State introduced into evidence a bottle, allegedly containing liquor, taken from
the defendant's premises. 99 In holding that the jury's independent analysis of
°°
smelling the contents of the liquor bottle did not create new facts,' the Dascenzo
court stated,
No juror can receive evidence without the exercise of some of his
senses .... When physical things are introduced in evidence, jurors are permitted
to look at them, to decide what they think concerning them... .By doing so, the
juror did not gain independentevidence upon which to reach his conclusion,
but simply tested the evidence already introduced, in order to properly
determine its truth or probative value. In deciding every case, jurors must
necessarily take into consideration their knowledge and impressions founded
upon experience in their everyday walks of life, and the fact that these things
affect them in reaching their verdict cannot be reversible error, because, indeed,
jurors without possessing such knowledge and impressions could not be had.
After the liquor.. .has been received in evidence, to deny the jurors the right to
look upon it, smell it, and take into consideration its appearance and odor in
determining what it is, results in closing their eyes against the acquisition of the
truth.' 0'
12
v.
in aState
Dascenzo
revisited court
Court
Supremethe
Mexico
In 1991, the°3 New
jury's
held0 that
Chamberlain
Dascenzo,
Affirming
Chamberlain.'

95. Compare Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 733, 819 P.2d at 683 (concluding that the jury's experimentation
with evidence properly introduced into evidence did not create new evidentiary facts); Sena, 105 N.M. at 687,688,
736 P.2d at 492, 493 (holding that juror's statement to other jurors that "he knew defendant was guilty, but that
he could not base his conviction on anything he heard in the courtroom" alone was insufficient to indicate that
extraneous information reached the jury); Dascenzo, 30 N.M. at 36-37,226 P. at 2001-02 (determining that the
jurors' act of smelling the contents of a liquor bottle that was properly admitted in evidence did not create new
evidentiary facts); Hurst, 111 N.M. at 568, 807 P.2d at 752 (holding that one juror's statement to the jury that her
father had been involved in an accident and was forced to take the sole responsibility for his injury did not
constitute extraneous prejudicial information), with Sacoman, 107 N.M. 588, 762 P.2d 250 (holding that a juror's
statement made during deliberations regarding his personal expertise as a busboy constituted extraneous prejudicial
information).
96. See, e.g., Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 732,819 P.2d at 682 (noting that the jury did not consider evidence
not properly introduced at trial and analogizing the facts of its case to Dascenzo, 30 N.M. at 37-36, 226 P. 1099,
which held that an independent analysis by the jury of the contents of a liquor bottle did not create new facts);
Dascenzo, 30 N.M. at 36-37, 226 P. at 1100.
97. Dascenzo, 30 N.M. 34, 226 P. 1099.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 34-35, 226 P. at 1100.
100. The significance of whether "a new evidentiary fact" was created during jury experimentation is whether
a "new evidentiary fact" is "extraneous prejudicial information" for the purposes of invoking a Rule 11-606(B)
inquiry. See Chamberlain,112 N.M. at 733, 819 P.2d at 783 (concluding that because no new evidentiary facts
went before the jury during deliberations, testimony could not be elicited from the jury regarding its deliberations).
101. Dascenzo, 30 N.M. at 36-37, 226 P. at 1100 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 34, 226 P. at 1100.
103. 112 N.M. 723, 731-32, 819 P.2d 673, 681-82 (1991) (concluding that the facts of Dascenzo, "in
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"experimentation with properly admitted evidence in a manner not discussed at
trial" did not create new or extrinsic evidence."' In Chamberlain, the jury
conducted an experiment in which they removed a gun from its holster in order to
compare that noise with the noise heard on an audiotape played during trial.0 5 After
the verdict was entered, defense counsel learned of the juror's experiment and
moved for a new trial."0 Relying on out-ofstate precedent,' 7 the defendant argued
that "the experiment created new or extrinsic evidence" that may have prejudiced
the jury. 1°8 The court noted that, unlike the defendant's cited cases, the jury in
Chamberlaindid not consider evidence not properly introduced at trial because both
the gun and its holster were properly admitted into evidence.1 °9 Instead, the
Chamberlaincourt analogized the facts brought out at Chamberlain's trial to the
facts in Dascenzo, because the jurors in both of these cases used their experiences
and senses to examine items properly admitted into evidence. "0 The Chamberlain
court determined"' that, although error may occur if an experiment creates a new
evidentiary fact outside of the record," 2 "the jury must be allowed latitude to
evaluate evidence and to use its experience to deliberate."'' Because no new

relevant part, fare] virtually indistinguishable from the case at bar"). The Chamberlain court did not consider the
issue of whether jurors deliberated on evidence not properly before them. Instead, the issue in Chamberlain was
whether experimentation by jurors on the evidence before them "in a way not discussed at trial" constituted
"improper experimentation." Id. at 731, 819 P.2d at 681.
104. Id. at 732, 819 P.2d at 682.
105. Each of these items was properly moved into evidence at trial and was before thejury for its examination
during deliberations. See Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 732, 819 P.2d at 682.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing United States v. Homung, 848 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1988) (juror communicated with
acquaintance regarding the defendant); Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1987) (juror conducted at-home
experiment using husband's gun to verify testimony) Gayramoglu v. Estelle, 806 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1986) (juror
discussed degrees of murder with law librarian); Jennings v. Oku, 677 F. Supp. 1061 (D. Haw. 1988) (jury
conducted out-of-court experiment using ajuror's car that was not in evidence and not same model as one at issue);
Durr v. Cook, 442 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. La. 1977) (unauthorized reenactment of crime by juror outside of court);
Gorz v. State, 749 P.2d 1349 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (juror investigated length of time to walk from crime scene
to location the defendant observed)).
108. Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 731,819 P.2d at 681.
109. Id. at 732, 819 P.2d at 682.
110. Id.
111. See id. (relying on People v. Kurena, 410 N.E.2d 277 (il. 1980) (jurors properly fashioned cardboard
knife to evaluate evidence presented at murder trial where actual knife was admitted into evidence and the
experiment attempted to verify testimony); State v. Ashworth, 647 P.2d 1281 (Kan. 1982) (jury properly conducted
experiment using exhibits admitted into evidence to verify testimony); State v. Thompson, 524 P.2d 1115 (Mont.
1974) (jury properly used physical evidence in conjunction with testimony to determine credibility when the jury
acts in accordance with the testimony and no new facts are discovered)).
112. Id. (citing Simon v. Kuhlman, 549 F. Supp. 1202, 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("A review of the case law
dealing with juror experiments, however, suggests that where the jurors are not informed of extra-recordfacts but
merely observe an experiment in the jury room 'testing' certain of the record evidence, their verdict is not
constitutionally defective. On the other hand, courts have viewed experiments outside the jury room as infecting
the deliberations with such extra-record material that the verdict has been rendered constitutionally invalid.")
(emphasis added); State v. Asherman, 478 A.2d 227, 254 (Conn. 1984) (citing Durr, 442 F. Supp. 487 (new
evidentiary fact introduced when jury foreman reenacted the homicide outside of the jury room and reported the
results to his fellow jurors)); People v. Brown, 399 N.E.2d 51 (N.Y. 1979) (new evidentiary fact created when juror
conducted independent test of visibility using motor vehicle different from that described in the evidence and
reported results to the jury)).
113. Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 732, 819 P,2d at 682 (citing United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1026
(6th Cir. 1983)).
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evidentiary facts went before the jury during deliberations, testimony could not be
elicited from the jury regarding its deliberations." 4
In 1993, the New Mexico Supreme Court again addressed whether jurors tainted
their verdict with extraneous information by virtue of improper experimentation in
the jury room. In State v. Griffin,"5 the court held that the use of a magnifying glass
by thejury to scrutinize robbery photos did not constitute improper experimentation
16
by introduction of extraneous prejudicial information into deliberations. In so
visual acuity
holding, the Griffin court stated that "[e]nhancement of the jury's
7 there is some
through use of a magnifying glass is not experimentation unless"1 8
indication that the magnification produced additional evidence."'
The second line of cases analyzed by the Mann court involved a juror's reliance
on personal knowledge to weigh the facts before the court. In one such case, State
v. Sacoman, the New Mexico Supreme Court announced that "[c]ommunications
of specific knowledge from a particular juror to others involves extraneous
in a
information,"' 19 where one juror related his personal experience as a2 busboy
0 Noting the
1
murder.
the
case where the defendant had been a busboy at the time of
12
juror's statements "arguably contradicted" the defendant's testimony at trial, ' the
Sacoman court determined that, while jurors may draw from their knowledge and
experience when deliberating, they must confine their deliberations to evidence
properly admitted at trial and not consider external facts introduced by another
juror. 122 Thus, according to the Sacoman court, any communication of specific

114. Id. at 733, 819 P.2d at 683 (citing WEINSTEIN &BERGER, STuDENT EDITION, supra note 51, § 606[04]
("Rule 606(b) bars jurors from testifying regarding the processes by which a verdict was reached, although it does
not prohibit testimony on experiments that create knowledge that has not been obtained through evidence.")).
115. 116N.M. 689, 866P.2d 1156(1993).
116. Id. at 696, 866 P.2d at 1163 (During deliberations, the jury requested and was sent a magnifying glass
and photos of the robberies taken by the bank surveillance cameras.).
117. Although the Griffin court's holding indicates that experimentation is improper when it produces new
evidence, the Mann court affirmed the decision in Chamberlainthat experimentation by the jury is permissible
when it is based on properly admitted evidence. Thus, according to Mann, experimentation is proper even if it
produces new evidence, so long as that experiment was based on evidence properly before the jury. It is not the
experiment that is improper, but rather, it is the consideration of new facts not introduced at trial that is
impermissible. See Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 1 31, 39 P.3d at 134; Chamberlain,112 N.M. at 731-33, 819 P.2d
at 681-83.
118. Griffin, 116 N.M. at 696, 866 P.2d at 1163 (citing Taylor v. Reo Motors, Inc., 275 F.2d 699,705 (10th
Cir. 1960) (explaining that the salient question is whether a jury's investigation or experiment out of the presence
of the parties is within the scope or purview of the evidence introduced or amounts to taking evidence)). It should
be noted that the full quotation of the Griffin court ("Enhancement of the jury's visual acuity through use of a
magnifying glass is not experimentation unless there is some indication that the magnification produced additional
evidence.") indicates that experimentation is improper when it produces new evidence; the Mann court affirmed
the decision in Chamberlainthat experimentation by the jury is permissible when it is based on properly admitted
evidence. Thus, according to Mann, experimentation is proper even if it produces new evidence, so long as that
experiment was based on evidence properly before the jury. It is not the experiment that is improper, but, rather,
it is the consideration of new facts not introduced at trial that is impermissible. See id.; see also Mann, 2002NMSC-001, 31,39 P.3d at 134; Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 731-33, 819 P.2d at 681-83; Annotation, supranote
52, at 566.
119. State v. Sacoman, 107 N.M. 588, 590, 762 P.2d 250, 252 (1988).
120. Id. at 589, 762 P.2d at 251.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 590-91,762 P.2d at 252-53 (relying on State v. Thacker, 596 P.2d 508 (Nev. 1979) (holding that
statements made by jurors who worked at the same cattle ranch involved in case before them constituted extraneous
prejudicial information); State v. Larue, 722 P.2d 1039 (Haw. 1986) (characterizing a juror's communication
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knowledge from jurors, other than those facts properly admitted into evidence,
involves extraneous prejudicial information. 23
Prior to Sacoman, the sum of New Mexico decisions regarding extraneous
prejudicial information aligned with existing authority' 24 and the policies supporting
New Mexico Rule 11-606(B).' 25 Where New Mexico courts had been willing to
presume prejudice when external influences reached the jury, the courts would not
give credence to a claim of prejudice on the basis of internal influences.' 26
Sacoman, however, changed that by extending a presumption of prejudice to
include a juror's communication of personal knowledge to other members of the
jury, even though this personalknowledge was unrelatedto a party in the case.'27
Thus, the Sacoman court deviated from existing authority'2 8 by characterizing
communication of such knowledge as extraneous prejudicial information subject to
inquiry under New Mexico Rule 11-606(B). As a result, the Mann court was handed

regarding his personal experience as similar to victim's abuse as extraneous prejudicial information); State v.
Wisham, 384 So. 2d 385 (La. 1980) (holding that extraneous prejudicial information was introduced when two
jurors communicated that they saw the defendant's alibi witness arrested in courthouse hallway for perjury); Rogers
v. State, 551 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (determining that extraneous prejudicial information resulted
from juror's communication regarding his personal experience and statement "you never forget a face" in robbery
case involving eyewitness testimony); State v. Lorenzy, 109 P. 1064 (Wash. 1910) (holding that extraneous
prejudicial information resulted when juror communicated his personal knowledge that a particular hotel was a
house of prostitution)).
123. Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 590, 762 P.2d at 252 (citing Thacker, 596 P.2d 508).
124. Compare State v. Sena, 105 N.M. 686, 687-88, 736 P.2d 491,492-93 (1987) (holding that a juror's
statement to other jurors that "he knew defendant was guilty, but that he could not base his conviction on anything
he heard in the courtroom" alone was insufficient to indicate that extraneous information reached the jury); State
v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 123, 692 P.2d 45, 48 (1984) (jury's use of a dictionary, when their request to use such
was expressly denied by the court, amounted to extraneous information); State v. Doe, 101 N.M. 363, 683 P.2d
45 (1983) (holding that an account of witness intimidation, not presented at trial, was extraneous prejudicial
information because it reached the jury); Dascenzo, 30 N.M. at 36-37, 226 P. 1099, 2001-02 (determining that
the jurors' act of smelling the contents of a liquor bottle that was properly admitted in evidence did not create new
evidentiary facts), with 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, EVIDENCEMANUAL, supranote 69, § 606.03[l ][b],
at 606-9 (see
cases cited therein showing that extraneous prejudicial information is introduced when jurors inject specific extrarecord facts relating to the case before the jury); 25 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, § 624.72[l], at 624-96
("[Extraneous information] may be grounds for impeaching a jury verdict, especially where the influence relates
to an issue material to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.....
125. See supra notes 61, 62, and 63.
126. 26 MOORE ET AL., supranote 62, § 631.21 [ 1], at 631-58 ("Any inquiry into thejurors' beliefs, opinions,
discussions, or grounds is considered an inquiry into internal influences.....
127. Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 591, 762 P.2d at 253.
128. Compare Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 733, 819 P.2d at 683 (concluding that the jury's experimentation
with evidence properly introduced into evidence did not create new evidentiary facts); Sena, 105 N.M. at 687-88,
736 P.2d at 492-93 (holding that juror's statement to other jurors that "he knew defendant was guilty, but that he
could not base his conviction on anything he heard in the courtroom" alone was insufficient to indicate that
extraneous information reached the jury); Dascenzo, 30 N.M. at 36-37, 226 P. at 2001-02 (determining that the
jurors' act of smelling the contents of a liquor bottle that was properly admitted into evidence did not create new
evidentiary facts); Hurst v. Citadel, Ltd., 11 N.M. 566, 568, 807 P.2d 750, 752 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that one juror's statement to the jury that her father had been involved in an accident and was forced to take the
sole responsibility for his injury did not constitute extraneous prejudicial information); 3 WENSTEIN & BERGER,
EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 69, § 606.03[1](b], at 606-9 (see cases cited therein showing that extraneous
prejudicial information is introduced when jurors inject specific extra-record facts relating to the case before the
jury); 25 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, § 624.721], at 624-96 ("(Extraneous information] may be grounds for
impeaching a jury verdict, especially where the influence relates to an issue material to the guilt or innocence of
the defendant...."), with Sacoman, 107 N.M. 588, 762 P.2d 250 (holding that a juror's statement made during
deliberations regarding his personal expertise as a busboy constituted extraneous prejudicial information).
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the task of making its decision in light of Sacoman' s divergence from New Mexico
precedent and policy.
IV. RATIONALE
The Mann court concluded that Juror 7's reliance on his expertise as an engineer
to weigh and discuss Dr. Watts' testimony constituted proper deliberations for two
reasons: (1) Juror 7's calculations were based on evidence properly introduced at
trial'29 and (2) Juror 7's calculations did not create any new evidentiary facts not on
the record. 130 Additionally, Mann noted that its decision was consistent with prior
authority, Rule 11-606(B), and the principle of fairness.' 3 '
In an effort to place Juror 7's conduct into proper context,' 32 the Mann court
distinguished between jury tampering, 133 juror bias, 34 and juror misconduct. 3
Emphasizing a defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury as the underlying
principle in cases involving extraneous prejudicial information, Mann noted that
jury tampering and juror bias present the "clearest examples of potentially improper
influences upon a jury."' 3 6 In cases involving tampering and bias, the court is most
willing to presume that the defendant was prejudiced by extraneous information.'37
However, insofar as juror misconduct is concerned, the Mann court was reluctant
to presume that juror conduct introduced extraneous prejudicial information unless
a juror ignores specific instructions of the court.'38 Therefore, the Mann court was
unwilling to characterize as misconduct a juror's reliance on personal knowledge
during deliberations, so long as that knowledge is (1) gained outside of the trial, 3 9
(2) unrelated to the specifics of the case,"4 and (3) applied to the facts properly
presented at trial.' 41 Therefore, Mann reasoned that, in the absence of juror bias,
jury tampering, or identifiable juror misconduct, jury deliberations are not subject

129. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 31, 39 P.3d at 134, 136.
130. Id. IN 28, 38, 39 P.3d at 132-33, 136.
131. Id.127, 39P.3dat 132.
132. Id. 20, 39 P.3d at 129 ("Although several prior New Mexico cases, as well as some cases from other
jurisdictions, do not distinguish jury tampering, juror misconduct, and juror bias, we believe it would provide
clarification to do so.").
133. Jury tampering occurs as a result of private communications between third parties andjurors during trial
and about a matter pending in trial when not made in pursuance of known rules of the court. Mann, 2002-NMSC001, 21, 39 P.3d at 131 (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954); Mattox v. United States, 146
U.S. 140, 150 (1892)).
134. Defined as an inclination or prejudice. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 153 (7th ed. 1999).
135. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 120,39 P.3d at 129 ("Although several prior New Mexico cases, as well as
some cases from otherjurisdictions, do not distinguish jury tampering, juror misconduct, and juror bias, we believe
it would provide clarification to do so.").
136. Id. 127, 39 P.3d at 132.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See 25 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, § 624.72[1], at 624-96 ("Evidence not presented at trial, acquired
through out-of-court experiments, or otherwise, is deemed 'extrinsic."'). See also 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
EVIDENCE MANUAL, supranote 69, § 606.03[1][b], at 606-9.
140. See 25 MOORE ET AL., supranote 52, § 624.72[l], at 624-96 ("Evidence not presented at trial, acquired
through out-of-court experiments, or otherwise, is deemed 'extrinsic."'). See also 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
EVIDENCE MANUAL, supranote 69, § 606.03[l][b], at 606-9.
141. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 127,39 P.3d at 132 (citing State v. Anderson, 748 S.W.2d 201,205 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1985)).
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to intrusion under New Mexico Rule 11-606(B). 142 Accordingly, Mann rejected
Sacoman's broad statement that "communication of specific knowledge from a
particular juror to others involves extraneous information"'' 43 and clarified that
"jurors may properly rely on their background, including
professional and
' 44
educational experience to inform their deliberations."'
Further, the Mann court believed that Sacoman incorrectly applied the rationale
from cases involving jury tampering and bias to the Sacomanjuror's reliance on his
own background to assist deliberations on thecase before him.1 45 Mann considered
those cases clearly distinguishable because the issues presented by Sacoman and
Mann involved neither jury tampering nor juror bias. 146 Although the Mann court
recognized that a defendant can successfully challenge a biased juror for cause
during voir dire, 47 disclosure by the Sacomanjurorregarding his busboy experience
would not likely have resulted in an excusal because "a juror's work experience in
this context, although similar to an issue at trial, is not considered to affect the
ability of that juror to be fair and unbiased."'' 48 The Mann court, therefore,
concluded that Juror 7's ability to do calculations similar to those performed by the
defendant's
expert witness would "not provide a basis for Juror 7's excusal for
149
cause."'

Furthermore, the Mann court noted that Sacoman incorrectly based its decision
on out-of-state authority in which jurors had specific knowledge of extrajudicial
facts directly related to the litigation before them.' Finding those cases
distinguishable from the facts in Sacoman and Mann, the Mann court observed that
the Sacomanjuror simply related his own experience as a busboy to the jury; he did
not introduce information to the jury related to the defendant's place of
employment. ' Similarly, Mann concluded that Juror 7 relied on his own expertise
to inform his deliberations; he did not introduce extrajudicial facts related to the
specific case.'
53
Criticizing Sacoman as overly broad, the Mann court turned to Chamberlain
to support its conclusion that Juror 7's calculations did not result in extraneous

142. Id. 1 32, 39 P.3d at 134 (citing Dascenzo, 30 N.M. at 37, 226 P. at 1100 (reasoning that the fact that
a juror's knowledge and experience affects the deliberative process cannot be reversible error, because jurors
without knowledge and experience do not exist)).
143. Id. 24, 39 P.3d at 130 (quoting Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 590, 762 P.2d at 252).
144. Id. 27, 39 P.3d at 132 (citing Nichols v. Busse, 503 N.W.2d 173, 186 (Neb. 1993); Anderson, 748
S.W.2d at 205).
145. Id.
146. Id. By definition, a defendant "suffers prejudice" if a juror is biased, and "[o]ne juror's bias, even if it
does not influence other jurors, jeopardizes the defendant's right to an impartial jury." Id. 25, 39 P.3d at 132
(citing United States v.Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1199-1200 (1Oth Cir. 2000) ("juror's statement that juror knew
of defendant's reputation as a drug dealer constituted extraneous information because the statement raised the
possibility of bias against defendant as well as the juror's truthfulness during voir dire")).
147. ld. 26, 39 P.3d at 131.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing State v. Sanchez, 12 N.M. 247, 251-53, 901 P.2d 178, 182-84 (1995) (stating that a
defendant must demonstrate actual bias in the absence of exceptional circumstances justifying a finding of implied
bias)).
150. Id. 24, 39 P.3d at 130.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Chamberlain,112 N.M. 723, 819 P.2d 673.
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prejudicial information.' 54 Like the Chamberlainjurorswho experimented with the
police officer's gun and holster that were properly admitted as evidence, Juror 7's
calculations were similarly based on Dr. Watts' expert testimony and, thus, did not
create new or extrinsic evidence. 155 Further, the court stated that "it would be
inordinately bad policy to single out a juror who thoughtfully and conscientiously
engaged in deliberation" because he was 56able to articulate the rationale for his
conclusion based on the evidence at trial.
Rejecting the defendant's argument that Juror 7 discredited the expert's testimony, the court noted that Juror 7 had, in fact, agreed with Dr. Watts' calcula58
tions. 5 7 The court also clarified that jurors are not bound by an expert's opinion,1
and that, "although potential error may occur if an experiment creates a new evidentiary fact outside of the record for the jury, 9 the jury must be allowed latitude
to evaluate evidence and to use its experience to deliberate."''
Mann affirmed that "jurors must necessarily" apply their experience and knowledge when deliberating because jurors without such experience and knowledge do
not exist.' 6' Pointing out the inherent difficulty in trying to distinguish permissible
reliance on one's background while deliberating as a juror from impermissible
reliance on extraneous prejudicial information, the court emphasized the importance
of "allowing our jury system to function without improper interference, and the
to protect open, full, and complete deliberations among
critical need for this Court
162
members of the jury."'

154. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 30,39 P.3d at 134 (citing Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 732, 819 P.2d at 682).
155. In applying their own thought processes to Dr. Watts' expert opinion that "the probability of such an
accidental impalement as 'finite,' but 'never zero,"' several jurors expressed a probability as to what that finite
probability might be as "one in several million." Juror 9 estimated the probability of the defendant's version of the
accident as "'not in a zillion billion years....'" Juror 4 articulated the probability as "'one in 10 million."' Because
of his background, Juror 7 articulated a similar opinion with a "greater understanding" and in a "more complex
manner," explaining the basis behind Dr. Watts' mathematical conclusion. The court concluded that the
defendant's description of the impalement as a "'less than one in twenty million chance,' rather than Dr. Watts'
characterization of a 'freak accident,' is not a new evidentiary fact." Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, IN 28-31, 39 P.3d
at 133-34.
156. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 30, 39 P.3d at 133.
157. Id. 31, 39 P.3d at 134.
158. Id. (quoting Chamberlain,112 N.M. at 732, 819 P.2d at 682).
159. Id. (quoting Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 732, 819 P.2d at 682 (relying on Simon v. Kuhlman, 549 F.
Supp. 1202, 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("A review of the case law dealing with juror experiments, however, suggests
that where the jurors are not informed of extra-record facts but merely observe an experiment in the jury room
"testing" certain of the record evidence, their verdict is not constitutionally defective. On the other hand, courts
have viewed experiments outside the jury room as infecting the deliberations with such extra-record material that
the verdict has been rendered constitutionally invalid."); State v. Asherman, 478 A.2d 227,254 (Conn. 1984) (new
evidentiary fact introduced when jury foreman reenacted the homicide outside of the jury room and reported the
results to his fellow jurors); People v. Brown, 399 N.E.2d 51 (N.Y. 2d Dist. 1979) (new evidentiary fact created
when juror conducted independent test of visibility, using motor vehicle different from that described in the
evidence, and reported results to the jury)).
160. Id. (citing Chamberlain,112 N.M. at 732, 819 P.2d at 682; Griffin, 116 N.M. at 696, 866 P.2d at 1163
(citing Taylor v. Reo Motors, Inc., 275 F.2d 699, 705 (10th Cir. 1960) (salient question is whether a jury's
investigation or experiment out of the presence of the parties is within the scope or purview of the evidence
introduced or amounts to taking evidence))); People v. Turner, 99 Cal. Rptr. 186, 191 (Cal. App. 1971) (reasoning
that jurors' use of magnifying glass to examine photographs admitted into evidence was only extension of jurors'
sense of sight); Annotation, supra note 52, at 566.
161. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 32, 39 P.3d at 134 (quoting Dascenzo, 30 N.M. at 37, 226 P. at 1100).
162. Id. 33, 39 P.3d at 134.
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Mann further rejected the defendant's policy argument that allowing a juror to
rely on personal expertise during deliberations would result in a "'dumbing down"'
of juries because attorneys would feel compelled to excuse educated jurors.' 63 The
court reasoned that acceptance of this argument would "surely result in a chilling
effect on jury deliberations."'' " Further, the court reasoned that a juror's life
experiences, "without more as determined by the trial court, [would] not provide a
basis for challenging such individuals for cause and [would] not subject a jury
verdict to attack."' 6 5 The court noted that, although venire members whose life
experiences would affect their ability to be unbiased can be dismissed for cause, a
party wishing to remove a venire member, as a matter of strategy because of that
66
individual's life experiences, would have to do so with a peremptory challenge. 1
Affirming the defendant's conviction, the New Mexico Supreme Court narrowed
the Sacoman holding that "[c]ommunication of specific knowledge from a particular
juror to others involves extraneous information."' 167 In doing so, Mann made clear
that "[a] juror may properly rely on his or her education, experience and common
sense during deliberations," 6 and that "thorough discussion, informed by expertise
and based on evidence at trial, does not constitute extraneous prejudicial
information." 169 Accordingly, the court held that, "[u]nder [New Mexico] Rule 11606(B), such information concerning the juror's mental processes is not properly
the subject of juror testimony."'"7
V. ANALYSIS
In essence, Mann stands for the premise that, given that the facts are properly
before the jury, 7 ' the methods by which the jury analyzes those facts are not subject
to review by the courts. However, while Mann forecloses any attack on the methods
by which jurors deliberate, it purports to leave open the possibility that extraneous
prejudicial information may result if jurors create new evidentiary facts not on the
record.'72 Although the Mann decision is well supported by policies protecting the

163. Id. 1 34, 39 P.3d at 134-35.
164. Id.
165. Id. 34, 30 P.3d at 135 (emphasis added).
166. Id. Although not explicitly stated by the Mann court, its decision does not alter counsel's ability to
excuse educated jurors through the exercise of a peremptory challenge. Therefore, the ability of counsel to dumb
down a jury panel remains unchanged by the Mann opinion.
167. Id. 24, 39 P.3d at 130 (quoting Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 590, 762 P.2d at 252).
168. Id. 38, 39 P.3d at 136.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Information properly before the jury includes evidence admitted at trial and any discussions by the
jurors. See id. ("A juror may properly rely on his or her education, experience and common sense during
deliberations; thorough discussion, informed by expertise and based on evidence at trial, does not constitute
extraneous prejudicial information."). A juror's reliance on his background is proper so long as the juror's
knowledge is not material to the case before the jury. See 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note
69, § 606.03[1][b], at 606-9.
172. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 31,39 P.3d at 134 (citing Chamberlain,112 N.M. at 732, 819 P.2d at 682
("Although potential error may occur if an experiment creates a new evidentiary fact outside of the record for the
jury, the jury must be allowed latitude to evaluate evidence and to use its experience to deliberate.")). See also
Chamberlain,112 N.M. at 732, 819 P.2d at 682 (citing State v. Thompson, 524 P.2d 1115 (Mont. 1974) ("[The]
jury may use physical evidence in conjunction with testimony to determine credibility as long as it acts in
accordance with testimony and no new facts [are] discovered....")). However, neither Mann nor Chamberlain

Winter 2004]

EXTRANEOUS PREJUDICIAL INFORMATION

sanctity of jury deliberations,' the limitations it places on a party's ability to
invoke Rule 11-606(B), nonetheless, add to the tension between a party's due
process rights'74 and the jury's need for open and thorough deliberations. 75 This
section provides an analysis of whether the Mann court appropriately balanced the
policy considerations protecting juror deliberations against the due process rights
of a party seeking to invoke Rule 11-606(B). It does so by first determining whether
the court appropriately narrowed Sacoman's broad definition of extraneous
prejudicial information and, in doing so, whether the court made an appropriate
distinction between the application of ajuror's specialized knowledge as opposed
to common knowledge when engaging in jury deliberations. Next, it provides an
analysis of whether the court indeed left open a possibility for a party to intrude into
the jury room on a claim that jurors createda new fact by properly deliberating on
facts properly presented in open court.
A. The Mann Court Correctly NarrowedSacoman's BroadDefinition of
Extraneous PrejudicialInformation
Mann limited the only New Mexico Supreme Court decision supporting the
notion that a juror's reliance on his expertise and knowledge results in extraneous
prejudicial information when deliberating on evidence properly screened by the trial
process.176 By limiting Sacoman, Mann correctly held that Juror 7's engineering
177
expertise did not constitute an extraneous prejudicial influence on the jury.
Additionally, Mann correctly narrowed Sacoman's broad definition of extraneous
prejudicial information by limiting it to a juror's knowledge of78specific facts that
are material to the verdict and unscreened by the trial process.
The Mann court correctly demonstrated that the Sacoman court overstated the
definition of extraneous prejudicial information by showing that Sacoman

provides insight into how new evidence can be created when jurors deliberate on evidence properly before them.
173. See Rios v. Danuser Mach. Co., 110 N.M. 87, 90,792 P.2d 419,422 (1990) (noting that New Mexico
Rule 11-606(B) "is identical to Rule 606(b) adopted by Congress" and citing Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S.
107 (1987) for the premise "that Congress intended to preclude juror testimony concerning matters or statements
ofjurors during jury deliberations."). See also Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 731, 819 P.2d at 681; State v. McCarter,
93 N.M. 708,710,604 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1980); State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608,612,566 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1977);
Duran v. Lovato, 99 N.M. 242, 247, 656 P.2d 905, 910 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); FED. R. EvID. 606(b) advisory
committee's note (noting that "[u]nder the federal decisions the central focus has been upon insulation of the
manner in which the jury reached its verdict, and this protection extends to each of the components of deliberation,
including arguments, statements, discussions, mental and emotional reactions, votes, and any other feature of the
process"); 26 MOORE ET AL., supra note 62, § 631.21 [1], at 631-58.
174. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739 (1993) (stating that the ultimate inquiry when an
improper influence reaches the jury is whether the influence affects the jury's deliberations and thereby its verdict).
175. But see FED. R. EviD. 606(b) advisory committee's note (noting that Rule 606(b) "offers an
accommodation between [the] competing considerations" of ajury's need to freely deliberate and putting a verdict
beyond the reach of determining irregularities).
176. See Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 590-92,762 P.2d at 252-54 (holding that juror's reliance on his expertise
and extrinsic knowledge as a busboy, when deliberating on properly introduced evidence, constituted extraneous
information that created a presumption of prejudice).
177. See Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 138, 39 P.3d at 136.
178. See id. 1 24, 39 P.3d at 130 (stating that Sacoman's broad definition that communication of specific
knowledge from one juror to others involves extraneous prejudicial information "would be a sweeping and farreaching rule if actually applied").
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misapplied existing authority to the facts at issue in that case.'7 9 The Sacoman
decision turned on the court's threshold determination that extraneous information
was improperly brought to the jury's attention 8 ° when ajuror, during deliberations,
communicated specific knowledge about his busboy experience to the other
jurors. 8 ' Sacoman, in effect, characterized a juror's reliance on a personal
background that is similar to the defendant's case as an external influence on the
jury that is subject to juror testimony under Rule 11-606(B). 8 2 However, Mann
concluded that the Sacoman court incorrectly applied the rationale of the
defendant's out-of-state authorities in which jurors possessed knowledge of
extrajudicial facts directly related to the facts inissue." 3 Unlike the jurors in the
cases relied upon by Sacoman, the Sacoman juror's busboy experience had no
connection to Sacoman's busboy experience; the Sacomanjuror simply shared his
own experience as a busboy at a restaurant different from the one in which Sacoman
was employed. Extraneous prejudicial information would have been before the jury
had the busboy juror shared with other jurors that he knew the defendant or had
knowledge of the employment practices specific to the defendant's place of
employment.
Applying Mann to the facts of Sacoman would change Sacoman' s result. Under
Mann, the busboy juror's communication to the other jurors of his own experience
as a busboy would not be considered extraneous information. The juror's busboy
experience would be considered part of the juror's personal knowledge and not
knowledge specific to the facts before him. Thus, under Mann, the information
regarding the juror's busboy experience would have been appropriately considered
part of the juror's internal mental processes. As part of a juror's internal mental
processes, it would not be considered extraneous prejudicial information, and,
therefore, an attack on the jury's verdict would not lie under Rule 11-606(B).'8 4
The majority of jurisdictions support the Mann court's determination that a
juror's relevant knowledge of the specific facts in issue, not obtained in trial,
involves extraneous prejudicial information.' 85 Moreover, there is scant authority

179. Id.
180. See Rule 11-606(B) NMRA 2004 (providing that "a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement
occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's
mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent or dissent from the verdict.... except that a juror may testify
on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror").
181. Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 590,762 P.2d at 252 (holding that extraneous prejudicial information involves
"[c]ommunication of specific knowledge from a particular juror to [other jurors]").
182. Id. at 591,762 P.2d at 253 (determining that it was not disputed that the busboy juror's communication
was received by other jury members and was therefore presumptively prejudicial).
183. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 24, 39 P.3d at 131. See also Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 590-91, 762 P.2d at
252-53 (citing State v. Larue, 722 P.2d 1039 (Haw. 1986) (juror's communication regarding her personal
experience similar to victim's abuse characterized as extraneous information); State v. Wisham, 384 So.2d 385 (La.
1980) (two jurors communicated that they saw the defendant's alibi witness arrested in courthouse hallway for
perjury); citing State v. Thacker, 596 P.2d 508 (Nev. 1979) (statements made by a juror who worked at the same
cattle ranch involved in case before them constituted extraneous information); State v. Lorenzy, 109 P. 1064 (Wash.
1910) (juror's communication regarding his personal knowledge that a particular hotel was a house ofprostitution);
Rogers v. State, 551 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (juror's communication regarding his personal experience
and statement "you never forget a face" in robbery case involving eyewitness testimony)).
184. See Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 'J 23-26, 39 P.3d at 130-31.
185. See WEINSTEMN & BERGER, STUDENT EDmON, supra note 51, § 11.04[3] ("Rule 606(b) would not
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positing an opinion to the contrary.8 6 Thus, Mann's narrowing of Sacoman's broad
definition of extraneous prejudicial information represents the realignment of New
Mexico common law regarding extraneous prejudicial information,"' as well as
realignment with other existing authorities on this topic.'
However, while Mann correctly narrowed Sacoman's broad definition of
extraneous prejudicial information, the question becomes whether Mann reached
too far by not explicitly distinguishing between a juror's reliance on common
knowledge versus specialized knowledge that is particular to a juror.

render a witness incompetent to testify to juror irregularities such as exposure to threats, acceptance of bribes, or
possession of knowledge relevant to the facts in issue obtained not through the introduction of evidence but
acquired prior to trial, or during trial, through unauthorized views, experiments, investigations, news media, books
or documents, or through consultation with parties, witnesses or others, regardless of whether the jury misconduct
occurred within or without the jury room."); Annotation, supra note 52, at 566. See also Sena, 105 N.M. at 687-88,
736 P.2d at 492-93 (juror's statement to other jurors that "he knew defendant was guilty, but that he could not base
his conviction on anything he heard in the courtroom" alone was insufficient to indicate that extraneous
information reached the jury); Hurst v. Citadel, 111 N.M. 566, 568, 807 P.2d 750, 752 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991)
(juror's statement during deliberations to other jurors that her father had been involved in an accident and was
forced to take the sole responsibility for his injury did not constitute extraneous prejudicial information); Thacker,
596 P.2d 508 (holding that statements made by ajuror who worked at the same cattle ranch involved in case before
them, constituted extraneous information); Larue, 722 P.2d 1039 (juror's communication regarding her personal
experience similar to victim's abuse characterized as extraneous information); Wisham, 384 So. 2d 385 (two jurors
communicate that they saw the defendant's alibi witness arrested in courthouse hallway for perjury); Rogers, 551
S.W.2d 369 (juror's communication regarding his personal experience and statement "you never forget a face" in
robbery case involving eyewitness testimony); Lorenzy, 109 P. 1064 (juror'scommunication regarding his personal
knowledge that a particular hotel was a house of prostitution)).
186. See People v. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701, 703, 705 (N.Y.S.D. 2001) (ordering a new trial after a nurse
juror told the other members of the jury her opinion about the cause of the victim's death). Concluding that the
nurse juror made "nonevidentiary based conclusions" by "venturfing] beyond the legally admitted evidence at
trial," the Maragh court held that jurors "may not use their professional expertise to insert facts and evidence
outside the record." Id. However, the Maragh court also acknowledged recent jury reform measures aimed at
"eliminate[ing] exemptions" to "facilitate the selection of professionals to jury pools comprising 'a fair crosssection of the community."' Id. The Maraghcourt further noted that "[tihis reform plainly contemplates that a class
of professional individuals should contribute their 'wisdom and life experiences to the deliberative process."' Id.
(citing Judith S. Kaye, A Judge's Perspectiveon Jury Reform from the OtherSide of the Jury Box, 36 JUDGES [No.
4118, 21 (1997)).
187. See, e.g., Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 733, 819 P.2d at 683 (concluding that the jury's experimentation
with evidence properly introduced into evidence did not create new evidentiary facts); Sena, 105 N.M. at 687-88,
736 P.2d at 492-93 (holding that juror's statement to other jurors that "he knew defendant was guilty, but that he
could not base his conviction on anything he heard in the courtroom" alone was insufficient to indicate that
extraneous information reached the jury); Dascenzo, 30 N.M. at 36-37, 226 P. at 2001-02 (determining that the
jurors' act of smelling the contents of a liquor bottle that was properly admitted into evidence did not create new
evidentiary facts); Hurst, Ill N.M. at 568, 807 P.2d at 752 (holding that one juror's statement to the jury that her
father had been involved in an accident and was forced to take the sole responsibility for his injury did not
constitute extraneous prejudicial information).
188. See, e.g., Rios, 110 N.M. at 90, 792 P.2d at 422 (noting that "Congress intended to preclude juror
testimony concerning matters or statements ofjurors duringjury deliberations"); Thacker,596 P.2d 508 (statements
made by a juror who worked at the same cattle ranch involved in case before them constituted extraneous
information); Larue, 722 P.2d 1039 (juror's communication regarding her personal experience similar to victim's
abuse characterized as extraneous information); Wisham, 384 So. 2d 385 (two jurors communicated that they saw
the defendant's alibi witness arrested in courthouse hallway for perjury); Rogers, 551 S.W.2d 369 (juror's
communication regarding his personal experience and statement "you never forget a face" in robbery case involving
eyewitness testimony); Lorenzy, 109 P. 1064 (juror's communication regarding his personal knowledge that a
particular hotel was a house of prostitution); FED. R. EvtD. 606(h) advisory committee's note; 26 MOORE ET AL.,
supranote 62, § 631.21[1]-[3], at 631-58 to 631-62.
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B. The Mann Court Refused to Engage in Definitional-LineDrawingBetween
Specializedand Common Knowledge by Drawing a New Line Between Good
Facts and Bad Facts
While jurors are expected to apply their common knowledge to deliberate on the

case before them, 189 use of specialized knowledge that is particular to individual
jurors can be said to unconstitutionally encroach on a party's due process rights.' 9°
A juror is said to cross over from the permissible common knowledge side of the
line to that of the impermissible specialized knowledge side when the juror, in
effect, becomes a witness to the trial by injecting new facts into the deliberations,
as opposed to applying wisdom and experience to the facts presented in open
court. 9 ' Although this guideline purports to create a definitional line to assist the
court in distinguishing between specialized and common knowledge, it provides
little guidance given that courts are still left to determine the point where new facts
are indeed introduced. As a result, many jurisdictions come down on either side of
the line by making the determination in light of the specific piece of knowledge at
issue.' 92 The Mann court, however, refused to engage in this definitional line
drawing and, instead, focused solely on whether the juror's knowledge, specialized
or common, was applied to those facts properly presented at trial.
The holding in Mann turned on the court's determination that "Juror 7's
deliberations properly took their content from the evidence and testimony presented
at trial."' 93 Rejecting the idea that Juror 7's remarks rose to the level of an improper
professional opinion, Mann instead characterized it as an expression of Juror 7's
subjective assessment of the evidence on the record. 94 Because Juror 7 applied his
expertise and knowledge to facts presented during trial, Mann concluded that Juror
7's statements to the jury "constituted proper deliberations based upon his
professional and educational experience,"' 9 5 including expertise "in particular
'
subjects. 196

189. See Dascenzo, 30 N.M. at 34, 226 P. at 1100.
190. See 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 69, § 606.03[l][b], at 606-9, and cases
cited within.
191. Id.
192. See 3 WEINSTEIN &BERGER, EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 69, § 606.04 [5] [b] (citing to Gualt v. Poor
Sisters of St. Francis Seraph of Perpetual Adoration, Inc., 375 F.2d 539,548-51 (6th Cir. 1967) (in a case involving
caustic cleaning solution causing injuries to pregnant plaintiff, juror's statement regarding his organization's policy
on women working after their seventh month of pregnancy held to be "commonly known facts of life which jurors
are supposed to possess and to bring to their consideration of the case"); United States v. Caro-Quintero, 769 F.
Supp. 1564, 1579 (C.D. Cal. 1991), affd sub. nom United States v. Bernabe-Ramirez, 42 F.3d 1403 (9th Cir.
1994) (personal information ofjuror regarding peso-dollar exchange rate considered common knowledge); United
States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1533 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (juror's personal knowledge of the defendant acquired
before trial and the fact that he had been involved in similar litigation resulted in extrinsic evidence)). But cf.
Maragh, 729 N.E.2d at 703 (nurse juror's "nonevidentiary based conclusions" "ventured beyond the legally
admitted evidence at trial").
193. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 30, 39 P.3d at 133.
194. Id. 30,39 P.3d at 133 (citing State v. Mann, 2000-NMCA-088, 102, 11 P.3d 564,587, cert. granted,
129 N.M. 99 (2000), and aff'd, 2002-NMSC-001, 39 P.3d 124).
195. Id. 28, 39 P.3d at 132.
196. See id. 32,39 P.3d at 134 (citing State v. Dickens, 926 P.2d 468,483 (Ariz. 1996) (en banc) (holding
that a mechanic juror's statement that he rejected the defendant's claim based on his expertise did not constitute
extraneous information); State v. Heitkemper, 538 N.W.2d 561, 563-64 (Wis. App. 1995) (pharmacist juror's
remark that he disbelieved a witness based on his knowledge as a pharmacist); Wagner v. Doulton, 169 Cal. Rptr.

Winter 2004]

EXTRANEOUS PREJUDICIAL INFORMATION

An interpretation of Mann's conclusion that jurors may rely on their educational
backgrounds and professional expertise'9 7 is that the New Mexico Supreme Court
has adopted an expansive view of what constitutes common knowledge by placing
Juror 7's engineering expertise on the permissible common knowledge side of the
line. However, a more accurate interpretation of the court's conclusion is that the
New Mexico Supreme Court will not engage in distinguishing common from
specialized knowledge. 98 In fact, the Mann court explicitly rejected the notion that
a juror's expertise is extrinsic information warranting relief if used during
deliberations.199 By refusing to engage in this difficult line-drawing exercise, Mann
redefines the line from one based on jurorknowledge to one based on facts. °° By
clarifying that a juror can rely on personal knowledge, specialized or common, the
Mann court held that jurors do not introduce new facts into deliberations when they
limit their deliberations to those facts properly presented at trial. In doing so, the
Mann court defined a new line aimed at balancing a party's due process rights
against the need to protect jury deliberations. The Mann court drew this line at the
point where facts presented in open court and protected by the trial process end and
the introduction of new facts, unscreened by the court, begin.
The Mann decision ignores the common knowledge and specialized knowledge
distinction, but nonetheless strikes a constitutional balance between a party's due
process rights and thejury's need to freely deliberate. Although the court obviously
falls on the side of the line that favors the sanctity of jury deliberations, its does so
in accordance with both precedent and policy.2"' The Mann court supported its
decision by relying on cases where courts found a juror's area of expertise

550, 552-53 (Cal. Ct .App.1980) (concluding that an engineer juror's map, drawn based on evidence in trial and
used during deliberations, did not constitute extraneous prejudicial information)).
197. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, ' 28, 32, 39 P.3d at 132, 134.
198. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 1 32, 39 P.3d at 134 (supporting its decision that a juror's expertise in
particular subjects is not extrinsic information with Wagner v. Doulton, 169 Cal. Rptr. 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(concluding that an engineer juror's map, drawn based on his understanding of the testimony and used during
deliberations, did not constitute extraneous evidence); State v. Heitkemper, 538 N.W.2d 561 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)
(concluding that a pharmacist juror's remark based on his professional expertise that he disbelieved witness
testimony regarding drug ingestion did not constitute extraneous information); State v. Dickens, 926 P.2d 468,483
(Ariz. 1996) (en banc) (holding that a mechanic juror's statement that he did not believe the defendant's claim that
his truck overheated based on his expertise did not constitute extraneous information); see also 3 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 69, § 606.03[1l][] ("A complete sanitizing of the jury room is
impossible, because the subjective opinions ofjurors, their attitudes, or their philosophies cannot be expunged from
jury deliberations. These human elements constitute one of the strengths of the jury system, which should not be
excluded from jury deliberations."); Kaye, supranote 186, at 18, 21 (supporting the notion that a fair cross section
of ajury pool includes a class of professional individuals that should contribute their specialized knowledge to the
deliberative process)).
199. See Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 1 32, 39 P.3d at 134.
200. See id. 31, 39 P.3d at 134 (citing Chamberlain,112 N.M. at 732-33,819 P.2d at 682-83 ("Although
potential error may occur if an experiment creates a new evidentiary fact outside of the record for the jury, the jury
must be allowed latitude to evaluate evidence and to use its experience to deliberate.")); see also Chamberlain, 112
N.M. at 732, 819 P.2d at 682 (citing State v. Thompson, 524 P.2d 1115 (Mont. 1974) (holding that jurors may
experiment in conjunction with testimony to determine credibility as long as it acts in accordance with testimony
and no new facts are discovered)).
201. See 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 69, § 606.03(l][b] ("A complete
sanitizing of the jury room is impossible, because the subjective opinions of jurors, their attitudes, or their philosophies cannot be expunged from jury deliberations. These human elements constitute one of the strengths of the
jury system, which should not be excluded from jury deliberations."); Kaye, supra note 186, at 18, 21 (discussing
a class of professional individuals that should contribute their specialized knowledge to the deliberative process).
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irrelevant when the juror applied his or her expertise to the facts properly presented
at trial.2 °2 Further, the court's decision is supported by recognition that "complete
sanitizing of the jury room isimpossible, because the subjective opinions of jurors,
their attitudes, or their philosophies cannot be expunged fromj ury deliberations."2 °3
Further, supporting the Mann decision is the suggestion that, even if complete jury
room sanitization were possible, our courts should not pursue this as a laudable
goal.2°4 Specifically, it is recognized that individual characteristics of jurors serve
as an actual strength of the jury system, and, therefore, "should not be excluded
from jury deliberations."2 5 So, while a party may disagree with the Mann court's
approach to the common and specialized knowledge distinction, the court's decision
was nonetheless principled and does not unconstitutionally balance away a party's
right to invoke Rule 11-606(B).
C. Mann Correctly Relied on the Chamberlain Decision
20 6 is arguably different
Even though the juror conduct involved in Chamberlain
7
than that involved in Mann, both cases involved jurors who simply sought to
weigh the evidence properly before them.20 8 This conduct has long been held in
New Mexico as proper juror conduct because jurors are expected and requiredto
"test[] evidence already introduced, in order to properly determine its truth or
probative value." 20 9 Thus, Mann appropriately limits a party's ability to invoke Rule
11-606(B) insofar as the jury attempts to reach its verdict by engaging in the very
conduct with which it is charged. The conduct tied to the weighing of evidence
encompasses the very internal influences 210 that Rule 11-606(B) seeks to protect
from unwarranted intrusion. 21 1 As a result, both Chamberlainand Mann are well

202. See cases cited supra note 198.
203. See 3 WEINsTEIN & BERGER, EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 69, § 606.03[1][b] ("A complete
sanitizing of the jury room is impossible, because the subjective opinions of jurors, their attitudes, or their
philosophies cannot be expunged from jury deliberations. These human elements constitute one of the strengths
of the jury system, which should not be excluded from jury deliberations."); Kaye, supra note 186, at 18, 21
(discussing aclass ofprofessional individuals that should contribute their specialized knowledge to the deliberative
process).
204. See 3 WEINSTEIN &BERGER, EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 69, § 606.03 [1 ][b]; Kaye, supra note 186,
at 18, 21 (discussing a class of professional individuals that should contribute their specialized knowledge to the
deliberative process).
205. See 3 WEINSTEIN &BERGER, EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 69, § 606.03[1][b]; Kaye, supranote 186,
at 18, 21 (discussing a class of professional individuals that should contribute their specialized knowledge to the
deliberative process).
206. The jury experimented with the officer's gun and holster to determine whether the noise heard on the
officer's belt tape was, in fact, caused by the officer pulling his gun from his holster. Chamberlain,112 N.M. at
732, 819 P.2d at 682.
207. Calculations based on expert testimony. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 30, 39 P.3d at 133.
208. The Chamberlaincourt analogized the facts of its case, one based on juror experimentation, to other
cases involving juror reliance on "experience and senses to examine.. .evidence." See Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at
732, 819 P.2d at 682.
209. Dascenzo, 30 N.M. at 34, 226 P. at 1100.
210. 25 MOORE ET AL., supranote 52, § 631.21 [1], at 624-96 ("Any inquiry into thejurors' beliefs, opinions,
discussions, or grounds is considered an inquiry into internal influences....").
211. See Rule 11-606(B) NMRA 2004. See also Rios v. Danuser Mach. Co., 110 N.M. 87,90,792 P.2d 419,
422 (1990) (noting that New Mexico Rule 11-606(B) "is identical to Rule 606(b) adopted by Congress" and citing
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), for the premise "that Congress intended to preclude juror testimony
concerning matters or statements of jurors during jury deliberations"); Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 731, 819 P.2d
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supported by policies aimed at walling off jury deliberations from any claim that a
by jurors' legitimate attempts to test the veracity of the
party was prejudiced 212
evidence before them.
However, the analysis does not end here. Although Mann closes the door on a
claim that a party was prejudiced by juror conduct when deliberating on properly
screened evidence,2 13 it may have left open a window for intrusion into the jury
room on a somewhat different claim. In dicta, Mann perpetuated a notion, posited
by the Chamberlaincourt,214 that a party may be entitled to a new trial under Rule
11-606(B) if juror experimentation, even though conducted in the jury room on
21 6
properly protected evidence, 215 creates new evidentiary facts. Because neither
Chamberlainnor Manndiscussed how new evidentiary facts might be created under
these circumstances, analysis is required to determine if this truly can happen.
D. Mann Perpetuateda Myth That Jurors Can Create Bad Facts While
Experimenting on Good Facts
217 the Mann court determined that Juror 7's exercise
Relying on Chamberlain,
in statistical analysis was a permissible attempt to more closely examine those facts
properly presented at trial and, therefore, did not give rise to extraneous prejudicial
information.2" 8 However, the court also posited that it is possible for jurors to create
new evidentiary facts in the course of permissible experimentation on evidence
at 681 (citing State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 612, 566 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1977) ("We agree with the policy that
discourages, and in most instances prohibits, any inquiry or intrusion into the jury room.")); Duran v. Lovato, 99
N.M. 242,247,656 P.2d 905,910 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) ("It is well settled that ajuror may not impeach the verdict
as to matters that inhere therein after the jury has been discharged."); FED. R. EviD. 606(b) advisory committee's
note; 25 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, § 624.71 [1], at 624-92 to 624-94; 26 MOORE ET AL., supra note 62, §
631.21[1], at 631-58 to 631-59.
212. See cases cited supra note 211; see also FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee's note; 25 MOORE
ET AL., supranote 52, § 624.71 [1], at 624-92 to 624-94; 26 MOORE ET AL., supra note 62, § 631.21 [1], at 631-58
to 631-59.
213. There is discussion in the federal arena that "the door of the jury room is not necessarily a satisfactory
dividing point." See FED. R. EviD. 606(b) advisory committee's note (relying on Mattox, 146 U.S. 140). However,
this discussion should not confound the reader because the jury room door is an appropriate dividing point, given
that the information going into that door is protected by the trial process and, therefore, uncontaminated. See id.
(indicating that there are circumstances when the jury room door is an appropriate dividing point when stating that
the "Supreme Court has refused to accept" the jury room door as a dividing point "for every situation") (emphasis
added); see also Mattox, 146 U.S. at 149 (stating that the"jury should pass upon the case free from externalcauses
tending to disturb [the verdict]") (emphasis added).
214. The Chamberlaincourt put forward the notion that while it bars jurors from testifying regarding the
processes by which a verdict was reached, Rule 606(b) does not bar juror testimony on experiments that "create
knowledge that has not been obtained through evidence." See Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 733, 819 P.2d at 683.
215. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 31, 39 P.2d at 134 (positing that potential error may occur if an experiment
in the jury room creates new evidentiary facts).
216. See Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 733, 819 P.2d at 683 (citing 3 WEINsTEIN & BERGER, EVIDENCE
MANUAL, supra note 69, § 606 (04] ("Rule 606(B) bars jurors from testifying regarding the processes by which
a verdict was reached, although it does not prohibittestimony on experiments thatcreate knowledge that hasnot
been obtained through evidence.") (emphasis added)).
217. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 1 31,39 P.3d at 134 (citing Chamberlain, 112 N.M. 723, 732-33,819 P.2d
673, 682-83 ("Although potential error may occur if an experiment creates a new evidentiary fact outside of the
record for the jury, the jury must be allowed latitude to evaluate evidence and to use its experience to deliberate.")).
See also Chamberlain,112 N.M. at 732, 819 P.2d at 682 (citing State v. Thompson, 524 P.2d 1115 (Mont. 1974)
(holding that jurors may experiment in conjunction with testimony to determine credibility as long as it acts in
accordance with testimony and no new facts are discovered)).
218. See Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, l 28-32, 39 P.3d at 132-34.
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properly presented in open court. Unfortunately, Mann failed to expressly assign
meaning to the word create. Further, decisions from other courts" 9 addressing tests
and experiments in the jury room yield few rules to illuminate what the Mann court
meant by its supposition that new evidence could be created.22 Thus, the analysis
of whether jurors can create new evidentiary facts when experimenting on those
properly presented at trial is most reasonably made by applying the plain meaning
of the word create to Mann's holding.
The Mann court held that ajuror's application of knowledge to the facts properly
presented in open court is a proper internal process necessary to jury deliberations. 22' Further, the Mann court held that jurors are allowed to experiment in the
jury room so long as experimentation is limited to the facts properly presented at
trial. 2 Applying the plain meaning of the word create,223 the Mann decision shows
that it is not possible for jurors to create new facts when deliberating in the jury
room, by experimentation or otherwise, on those facts properly presented at trial.
Therefore, the court's dictum that jurors may be exposed to extraneous information
if an experiment creates a new fact is only a myth, unsupported in logic.
However, it is quite possible that the court's dictum is not a problem in logic, but
rather one rooted in semantics. While it may not be possible to create new facts
within the plain meaning of the word, it may be possible to discover new facts when
weighing those facts properly presented at trial. For example, assume that the jurors
receive into the jury room for deliberation the murder weapon and bloodied shirt
belonging to the victim. Each item was properly presented at trial and given over
to the jury with the permission of the court. Imagine that, while examining the shirt,
one juror discovers a long strand of hair encrusted into the bloodied shirt, unnoticed
until now and never presented as an independent piece of evidence during trial.
Now suppose that, upon examination of this hair, the jury decides that it fits the
exact description of the defendant's hair. In this scenario, the jurors discoverednew
evidence when deliberating on evidence that was properly presented at trial.
Although the evidence going into the jury room was thought to be good, it, in fact,
was bad. This situation would give rise to a presumption of prejudice necessary for
the defendant to invoke Rule 11-606(B).
Unfortunately, the Mann court did not expound upon its dictum that it may be
possible for jurors to create new facts when experimenting in the jury room on
properly presented facts. By failing to develop this discussion, the Mann court
perpetuated an unsupported myth that is left to be decided. In doing so, Mann
placed the burden squarely on the party requesting a new trial to show that jurors,
indeed, created new facts while deliberating on facts properly presented in open

219. Annotation, supra note 52, at 566, 571.
220. Id. at 566, 571-72 (citing United States v. Holmes, 30 Fed. Appx. 302 (4th Cir. 2002)).
221. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 38, 39 P.3d at 136.
222. Mann affirmed the decision in Chamberlainthat experimentation by the jury is permissible when it is
based on properly admitted evidence. Thus, according to Mann, experimentation is proper even if it produces new
evidence, so long as that experiment was based on evidence properly before the jury. It is not the experiment that
is improper but, rather, it is the consideration of new facts not introduced at trial that is impermissible. See Mann,
2002-NMSC-001, 31, 39 P.3d at 134; Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 731-33, 819 P.2d at 681-83.
223. Defined as "[t]o cause to come into existence; bring into being; make; originate;...to give rise
to.. cause..." WEBSTER'S NEW DIcrIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 332 (2d ed. 1979).
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court. Nonetheless, the court's placement of this burden is well supported by federal
and state common law 224 and correctly reflects the long-standing policy of drawing
the line in favor of juror privacy in the absence of any overt misconduct.225
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The Mann decision creates one pre-trial and two post-trial implications. First,
Mann highlights the need for careful selection of jurors during voir dire. Second,
Mann holds counsel accountable to the internal/external parameters of Rule 11606(B) by requiring a specific and limited inquiry into the validity of a verdict.
Lastly, the Mann decision alerts jurists to disharmony between the current state of
New Mexico law and existing jury instructions governing juror conduct.
A. Counsel Must Choose Carefully
For the pre-trial phase, the Mann decision highlights the need for careful
selection of jurors during the voir dire process. Because Mann falls on the side of
protecting the sanctity of jury deliberations, an attorney must carefully consider a
juror's knowledge and experiences during voir dire. Although this has always been
important, Mann underscores the need, because counsel can no longer invoke Rule
11-606(B) on the basis that a juror, by relying on his or her expertise to deliberate
on the facts properly presented at trial, acted in the impermissible role of witness.22 6
Therefore, it is important that counsel carefully tailor voir dire questions to not only
assist a prospective juror in understanding the significance of his or her knowledge
or background to the specific case,227 but also to assist counsel in selecting juror
attributes most favorable to the client. However, even if ajuror discloses a life event
similar to that of the client, similarity alone will not be enough to excuse that juror

on the basis that
224. Compare Doe, 101 N.M. at 366, 683 P.2d at 48 ("The party seeking a new trial
extraneous evidence reached the jury must make a preliminary showing that movant has competent evidence that
material extraneous to the trial actually reached the jury."); with Remmer v. U.S., 347 U.S. 229 (1954) ("[A]ny
private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter
pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of
known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge
of the parties."); 25 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, § 624.73[2] [a], at 624-109 (instructing that the defendant must
show a "reasonable possibility.. .that the extrinsic evidence could have affected the verdict).
225. 3 WEINSTEIN &BERGER, EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 69, § 606.04[l][b], at 606-15 to 606-16 ("If
overt factors are present by which the verdict's validity can be objectively assessed, the law's commitment to a just
result warrants receiving evidence as to the misconduct. If the juror would testify solely to matters resting in the
juror's own consciousness, however, the dubious value of the testimony is outweighed by the need for stability in
verdicts....").
226. See NMSA 1978, § 38-5-1 1(C) (1979) (questionnaires may be submitted to prospective jurors to obtain
information that will aid the court or parties in voir dire examination of jurors or in determining a juror's
qualifications to serve on a particular petit jury panel, trial jury or grand jury); NMSA 1978, § 38-5-14 (1991)
(challenges for cause and peremptory challenges).
227. See Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 126, 39 P.3d at 131 ("The juror did not necessarily commit misconduct
because she apparently did not attempt to deceive the parties during voir dire, but instead simply failed to
understand the significance of the events in her past to the case before her. Had she properly disclosed her history,
the defendant could have successfully challenged her for cause.").
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for cause.228 Rather, counsel will be required to show that a juror's knowledge or
background actually affects the ability of that juror to be fair.229
B. Counsel Must Tread Lightly
In addition to pre-trial considerations regarding jury selection, Mann brings to
light the need for a specifically focused post-trial inquiry into the validity of the
verdict on the basis that extraneous information reached the jury. Specifically,
counsel must now focus any inquiry on three areas: (1) any impermissible overt
acts, (2) the knowledge intrinsic to the individual juror, and (3) the facts going into

the jury room for deliberations.
After Mann, counsel's ability to interview jurors after they have been discharged
remains unchanged.23 ° Whether aj uror is competent to testify under Rule 11-606(B)
continues to depend on whether the jury was exposed to an improper external2 31
influence. 232 However, after Mann, a juror's reliance on his or her background is
considered a proper internal process given that the juror limits application of that
knowledge to those facts protected by the trial process. Thus, under Rule 11-606(B),
it is impermissible for the trial court to hear testimony regarding a juror's reliance
on his or her background under those conditions. With this in mind, counsel can
only render a juror competent to testify under Rule 11-606(B) by showing that the
jury was exposed to an improper external influence.2 33

228. Id. Counsel's ability to excuse a juror for cause will depend on counsel's ability to demonstrate actual
bias or exceptional circumstances justifying a finding of implied bias. Id. 26, 39 P.3d at 132 (relying on State v.
Sanchez, 120 N.M. 247, 251-53, 901 P.2d 178, 182-84 (1995)). Although the Sanchez court adhered to the
Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Phillips,455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982), that a juror alleging juror partiality must
show actual bias, it opened the door in dicta that "Smith may not be the last word on whether the implied bias is
always inappropriate." See Sanchez, 120 N.M. at 252,901 P.2d at 183. In support of its dictum, the Sanchez court
referenced Justice O'Connor's special concurrence in Smith:
I am concerned.. .that in certain instances a hearing may be inadequate for uncovering ajuror's
biases, leaving serious question whether the trial court had subjected the defendant to manifestly
unjust procedures resulting in a miscarriage of justice. While each case must turn on its own
facts, there are some extreme situations that would justify a finding of implied bias. Some
examples might include a revelation that the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting
agency, that the juroris a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal
transaction,or that thejurorwas a witness or somehow involved in the criminal transaction.
Whether or not the state proceedings result in a finding of "no bias," the Sixth Amendment
right to an impartialjury should not allow a verdict to'standunder such circumstances.
Id. (citing Smith, 455 U.S. at 252 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added)).
229. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001,1 26, 39 P.3d at 131.
230. The Mann opinion does not speak to the propriety of this practice. See generally Dale R. Agthe,
Annotation, ProprietyofAttorney's Communicationwith JurorsafterTrial, 19 A.L.R. 4th 1209,1212 (1983) ("In
particular cases, courts have held attorneys' post-verdict communications with jurors to be proper or defensible
where they were engaged in for an attorney's self-education and where an attorney sought to impeach a jury's
verdict by showing that the jury considered extrajpdicial evidence.") (internal parentheticals and citations omitted).
231. See supra notes 121, 208. See also 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 69,
§ 606.03[I][b], at 606-9.
232. See Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, [31, 39 P.3d at 134.
233. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 69, § 66.04[4] [a], at 606-28 to 606-35 ("Rule
606(b) would not render a witness incompetent to testify to juror irregularities such as exposure to threats,
acceptance of bribes, or possession of knowledge about the facts of the case acquired prior to trial or during trial
through unauthorized views, experiments, investigations, news media, books or documents, or through consultation
with parties, witmesses, or others, or through other extra-record channels, regardless of whether the jury misconduct
occurred in or out of the jury room.").
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To determine whether a juror has been exposed to an improper external
influence, counsel should first look for any low hanging fruit in the form of juror
bias, jury tampering, or juror misconduct. Because the court is most willing to
presume prejudice with a showing of juror bias or jury tampering, these situations
present the easiest opportunities for counsel to invoke Rule 11-606(B). Next,
counsel should determine whether any juror failed to follow explicit instructions of
the court. In this situation, the court is no less willing to extend the presumption of
prejudice, because this behavior falls under the category of juror misconduct.
However, in the absence of any overt act showing juror bias, jury tampering, and
juror misconduct, counsel must next determine whether the juror members,
themselves, introduced extraneous information while debating on properly screened
evidence. Unless counsel is able to get into the jury room without intruding into the
sacred internal processes of the jury, any claim that the defendant was prejudiced
by information generated by the jury itself will not lie under Rule 11-606(B).
Fortunately, the Mann court made this task relatively straightforward by focusing
counsel's inquiry on two issues: (1) the knowledge belonging to the individual juror
and (2) the facts going into the jury room for deliberation. When addressing juror
knowledge, counsel need only ascertain whether an individual juror had knowledge
specific to the case that was gained outside of the trial process. An affirmative
response will allow counsel to invoke Rule 11-606(B) on the basis that extraneous
information reached the jury.
Further, an understanding of the intersection between a juror's knowledge and
the existence of overt acts may assist counsel in accurately targeting the specific
improper external influence necessary to invoke Rule 11-606(B). Specifically,
counsel should ascertain how the juror came to have information material to the
case and acquired outside of the protections of the trial process, because a juror's
responses to that inquiry may focus counsel back to the presence of improper overt
acts. For example, a juror may have acquired his or her knowledge prior to trial but
missed its significance during voir dire. In which case, a motion for a new trial may
be more appropriately framed on the basis of juror bias. Further, the juror could
have acquired the knowledge as a recipient of an ex parte communication during the
trial itself, or by an impermissible visit to the scene. Here, counsel's motion would
be fashioned to show juror tampering or misconduct.
Next, counsel's inquiry should focus on the facts going into the jury room for
deliberation. Under this inquiry, the question is whether the jury confined its
deliberations to the facts properly screened at trial. If the jury failed to do so, the
court is willing to presume that a defendant has been prejudiced and a juror will be
rendered competent to testify under Rule 11-606(B). To determine whether the jury
considered new facts in reaching its verdict, counsel should account for every fact
going into the jury room and considered by thejury in reaching its verdict. In sifting
through these facts, counsel should first ascertain whether each fact was one that
was properly screened and protected through the trial process. Counsel's fact-based
inquiry ends here if counsel is able to determine that each fact was indeed screened
through the trial process.
Once juror interviews have been completed, counsel must next convince the
court that the verdict was tainted by extraneous information or some other improper
external influence. To pass the court's muster for a new trial under Rule 11-606(B),
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counsel must show that extraneous information actually reached the jury.234 Once
counsel makes such a showing, the bar is not high for a grant of a new trial.
Specifically, the trial court should grant the new trial if there exists a "reasonable
possibility" that the extraneous information prejudiced the client.235 At the very
least, the trial court has a duty to investigate or, in appropriate cases, conduct an
evidentiary hearing when counsel makes the requisite showing and there exists a
reasonable possibility of prejudice.236
In the absence of any showing of improper external influences on the jury, the
jurors are walled off, not only from intrusions into their thoughts, but also from
intrusions into their conduct. However, while Mann closed the jury room door on
Rule 11-606(B) inquiries based on jury conduct, it did leave open the jury room
window for counsel to challenge the verdict on the basis that a new fact was created
238
during juror experimentation in the jury room." 7 Because Mann shed little light
on how this might occur,23 9 counsel should conduct another fact-based inquiry to
determine whether the jury exceeded any "permissible limits. '24 ° Generally,
permissible limits are maintained if "tests or experiments... merely result in a closer
examination of properly introduced evidence. '241' Therefore, to invoke Rule 11606(B) on the basis of jury experimentation in the jury room, counsel must show
that the experiment in question allowed the jury to consider a new evidentiary fact
that was not otherwise presented in open court.24 2 Given the holding in Mann,
counsel may be wise to fashion this type of verdict challenge to show that the jury's
experiment resulted in discovery, rather than creation of new facts.
Further, counsel should note that challenges to verdicts based on jury experimentation inside of the jury room are different from challenges to jury
experimentation that occurs outside of the jury room. Although the topics of jury
experimentation occurring outside rather than inside the jury room are tangentially
related, discussion regarding any distinctions may assist counsel in fashioning a
challenge to the verdict on the basis of juror experimentation.
As tempting as it may be for counsel to base the propriety of juror experimentation on whether that experimentation occurred inside the jury room as
opposed to outside, this would be inadvisable. Propriety of experimentation should
never be the focus of counsel's challenge to a verdict based on juror experimentation. Rather, counsel should identify the actual reason behind whether or not
an experiment is proper. This is accomplished by focusing on the internal/external

234. See Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 19, 39 P.3d at 129 (relying on State v. Doe, 101 N.M. 363, 366, 683
P.2d 45, 48 (1984) ("The party seeking a new trial on the basis that extraneous evidence reached the jury must
make a preliminary showing that movant has competent evidence that material extraneous to the trial actually
reached the jury.")).
235. State v. Sena, 105 N.M. 686, 688, 736 P.2d 491,493 (1987).
236. Id.
237. See Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 1 31, 39 P.3d at 134 (relying on Chamberlain,112 N.M. at 732, 819 P.2d
at 682 ("Although potential error may occur if an experiment creates a new evidentiary fact outside of the record
for the jury, the jury must be allowed latitude to evaluate evidence and to use its experience to deliberate.")).
238. See id.

239.
240.
241.
242.

Review of the literature provides little assistance as well. See generally Annotation, supra note 52.
Id. at 566, § 2.
Id. at 566, § 2b.
Id. at 566, § 2.

Winter 2004]

EXTRANEOUS PREJUDICIAL INFORMATION

distinction necessary to support a challenge under Rule 11-606(B).2 43 As a
preliminary matter, the distinction between juror experimentation performed inside
versus outside the jury room is not location-driven. 244 Rather, the propriety of
experimentation is rooted in the fundamental rule thatjurors may only consider the
facts in evidence,2 45 as well as the policy protecting the sanctity of jury deliberations. When jurors experiment outside of the jury room, they do so outside the
sanctity of the jury room and against the rules of the court. 247 Thus, New Mexico
courts protect a party's right to due process by classifying outside of the jury room
experimentation as misconduct 24 that is presumptively prejudicial. 249 However,
similar to other jurisdictions,25 New Mexico courts have consistently viewed
experimentation in the jury room as a proper method of deliberation when that
experimentation is based on evidence properly admitted at trial.25' Underpinning
this viewpoint is the idea that, when jurors experiment inside the jury room, they

243. See 26 MOORE ET AL., supra note 62, § 631.21 [1], at 631-68.
244. Cf 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 69, § 606.04[4][a], at 606-28 to 606-35
(Under Rule 606(b), jurors are competent to testify about juror misconduct, such as unauthorized experiments,
"regardless of whether the jury misconduct occurred in or out of the jury room.").
245. See UJI 13-106 NMRA 2004.
246. See supra note 211 and cases cited therein; see also FED. R. EvD. 606(b) advisory committee's note;
25 MOORE ET AL., supranote 52, § 624.71 [ 1], at 624-92 to 624-94; 26 MOORE ET AL., supranote 62, § 631.21 [1],
at 631-58 to 631-59.
247. See UJI 13-106 NMRA 2004; Rule 11-606(B) NMRA 2004 compiler's annotations (citing
Chamberlain,112 N.M. 723, 819 P.2d 673 (holding that jury's experiment in jury room was permissible because
the jury did not consider evidence or statements that were not presented to the court)).
248. See UII 13-106 NMRA 2004 (In reaching a verdict, jurors are confined to the facts and evidence elicited
during trial and may not "make experiments with reference to the case.").
249. See Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 127, 39 P.3d at 132 (noting that "some forms of misconduct, such as a
juror making an unauthorized visit to the scene of a crime, ... infringe on a defendant's right to a fair jury"); see
also Duran v. Lovato, 99 N.M. 242, 248, 656 P.2d 905, 911 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (new evidentiary fact created
when jurors conducted independent speed test on highway); Simon v. Kuhlman, 549 F. Supp. 1202, 1206
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[Clourts have viewed experiments outside thejury room as infecting the deliberations with such
extra-record material that the verdict has been rendered constitutionally invalid."); Durr,442 F. Supp. 487 (new
evidentiary fact introduced when jury foreman reenacted the homicide outside of the jury room and reported the
results to his fellow jurors); Brown, 399 N.E.2d 51 (new evidentiary fact created when jurorconducted independent
test of visibility, using motor vehicle different from that described in the evidence and reported results to the jury);
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, STUDENT EDMON, supranote 51, § 11.04[3], at 11-14 ("Rule 606(b) would not render a
witness incompetent to testify tojuror irregularities such as.. .unauthorized... experiments,...regardless of whether
the jury misconduct occurred within or without the jury room.").
250. See, e.g., State v. Ashworth, 647 P.2d 1281, 1287 (Kan. 1982) (jury properly conducted experiment
using exhibits submitted to it to verify testimony); People v. Kurena, 410 N.E.2d 277, 282 (I. App. 1980) (jurors
properly fashioned cardboard knife with which they evaluated evidence presented at trial when the actual knife had
been admitted into evidence and the purpose of the experiment was to verify the testimony); Simon, 549 F. Supp.
at 1206 ("A review of the case law dealing with juror experiments, however, suggests that where the jurors are not
informed of extra-record facts but merely observe an experiment in the jury room "testing" certain of the record
evidence, their verdict is not constitutionally defective."). See alsoAnnotation, supra note 52, at 566 (giving
overview and listing cases addressing experimentation in the jury room).
251. See, e.g., Dascenzo, 30 N.M. 34, 226 P. 1099 (concluding that jury's analysis of the liquor bottle was
proper when based on admitted evidence); Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 733, 819 P.2d at 683 (concluding that the
jury properly used evidence before it to evaluate conflicting evidence of the truth); cf. Griffin, 116 N.M. at 696,
866 P.2d at 1163 ("Enhancement of the jury's visual acuity through use of a magnifying glass is not
experimentation unless there is some indication that the magnification produced additional evidence."). In 2002,
the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed its earlier decision in Chamberlainthat experimentation is permissible
so long as it is conducted on properly admitted evidence. See Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 39 P.3d 124.
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do so within the sanctity of its walls and with the permission of the court.252 Thus,
the New Mexico Supreme Court is unwilling to extend a presumption of prejudice
to a juror's weighing of evidence by experimentation when juror experimentation
(1) occurs inside of the jury room and (2) is performed using properly admitted
evidence.253 With this in mind, any complaint that jurors introduced extraneous
information by experimenting outside of the
jury room should describe the
254
experimentation in terms of jurormisconduct.
C. The Court Must InstructAccurately
In addition to the need for counsel to appropriately focus any post-trial inquiry
on those questions germane to Rule 11-606(B), the Mann decision also highlights
the need to amend existing jury instructions governing juror conduct. While the
New Mexico Supreme Court has held thatjuror's may indeed experiment in the jury
room on evidence properly before them, 255 existing instructions indicate
differently.2 56
The New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions, promulgated by the New Mexico
Supreme Court, govern juror conduct in New Mexico.257 Uniform Jury Instruction
13-106 instructs jurors in civil cases that they "cannot make experiments with
reference to the case." 25 Uniform Jury Instruction 14-101 similarly instructs jurors
in criminal cases. However, since the New Mexico Supreme Court's 1991 decision
in Chamberlain, and arguably as far back as its 1924 decision in Dascenzo, it is
inaccurate to instruct jurors that they "cannot make experiments with reference to
the case., 25 9 Acknowledging the importance of allowing the jury "latitude to
evaluate evidence and to use its experience to deliberate,"260 the Mann court
affirmed that it is permissible for jurors to experiment in the jury room. 26 ' This
holding emphasizes the disharmony between New Mexico law and the current jury
instructions regarding jury experimentation in the jury room.262 This dissonance can

252. See Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 732, 819 P.2d at 681-82 (holding that experimentation by the jury is

permissible when based on facts or evidence properly before the jury).
253. See Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 9H 31-32, 39 P.3d 124, 134 (experimentation is permissible so long as
it is conducted on properly admitted evidence). See also Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 733, 819 P.2d at 683
(concluding that the jury properly used evidence before it to evaluate conflicting evidence of the truth because the
physical evidence was properly admitted at trial); Dascenzo, 30 N.M. 34, 226 P. 1099 (concluding that jury's
analysis of the contents of a bottle was proper when the bottle was properly admitted into evidence).
254. New Mexico Rule 11-606(B) renders ajuror competent to "testify on the question of whether extraneous
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly
brought to bear upon any juror."

255. See Mann, 2002-NMSC-001,
31, 39 P.3d at 134; Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 731, 819 P.2d at 681.
256. See UJI 13-106 NMRA 2004; UJI 14-101 NMRA 2004.
257. UII 13-106 NMRA 2004; UJI 14-101 NMRA 2004.

258. UII 13-106 NMRA 2004.
259. UJI 13-106 NMRA 2004 (instructing jurors that they "cannot make experiments with reference to the
case"); UJI 14-101 NMRA 2004 (instructing jurors that they "cannot make experiments with reference to the
case").

260. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 31, 39 P.3d at 134.
261. Id. 31-33, 39 P.3d at 134.
262. UJn 13-106 NMRA 2004; UJI 14-101 NMRA 2004. The term "experiment" includes the testing of
physical evidence presented at trial. See, e.g., Chamberlain, 112 N.M. 723, 819 P.2d 673 (jury conducted
experiments regarding a noise on an audiotape); Dascenzo, 30 N.M 34, 226 P. 1099 (jurors tested the physical
evidence by smelling contents of a bottle to determine whether it was ethanol).
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be reconciled by amending the relevant jury instructions263 to reflect the rule that
jurors may not experiment outside of the deliberation room.2 4 An example
amendment 265 to the UJI governing experimentation in the jury room in civil cases266
could read as follows:
Jurors must decide the case solely upon the evidence received in court. Jurors
must weigh this evidence during jury deliberations only. Jurors must not
conduct tests or experiments outside of the jury room. If a juror has a question
as to what constitutes a test or an experiment, that question should be directed
at the court before the conduct takes place. Jurors must not make visits to the
scene of the accident [or other event] without the express permission .of the
court. If the court determines that an inspection of the site is desirable, then the
court will escort the jury, as a whole, to the scene. This is known as a "jury
view." If a jury view is to be had in this case, then you will receive special
instructions as to your duties.
The UJI governing criminal cases 267 could be similarly amended to instructjurors
that they must not conduct tests or experiments outside of the jury room. Further,
the compiler's annotations to UJI 13-106 and UJI 14-101 should be amended to
reflect current New Mexico law.268 Until such amendments are made, counsel may
consider requesting a new jury instruction that limits any admonition to the jury
regarding experimentation to those occurring outside of the jury room.
VII. CONCLUSION
Mann clarifies the confusion introduced by Sacoman by removing a juror's
reliance on his knowledge and expertise from the category of an improper external

263. See UJI 13-106 NMRA 2004; UJI 14-101 NMRA 2004.
264. Compare Duran v. Lovato, 99 N.M. 242, 248, 656 P.2d 905, 911 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (new
evidentiary fact created when jurors conducted independent speed test on highway); Simon v. Kuhlman, 549 F.
Supp. 1202, 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[C]ourts have viewed experiments outside the jury room as infecting the
deliberations with such extra-record material that the verdict has been rendered constitutionally invalid."); Durr,
442 F. Supp. 487 (new evidentiary fact introduced when jury foreman reenacted the homicide outside of the jury
room and reported the results to his fellow jurors); Brown, 399 N.E.2d 51 (new evidentiary fact created when juror
conducted independent test of visibility, using motor vehicle different from that described in the evidence and
reported results to the jury); with Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 39 P.3d 124; Chamberlain,112 N.M. at 733, 819 P.2d
at 683 (concluding that the jury properly used evidence before it to evaluate conflicting evidence of the truth);
Dascenzo, 30 N.M. 34, 226 P. 1099 (concluding that jury's analysis of the liquor bottle was proper when based
on admitted evidence).
265. Using UJI 13-106 NMRA 2004, as modified by this author.
266. UJI 13-106 NMRA 2004.
267. UJI 14-101 NMRA 2004.
268. Compare Duran v. Lovato, 99 N.M. 242, 248, 656 P.2d 905, 911 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (new
evidentiary fact created when jurors conducted independent speed test on highway); Simon v. Kuhlman, 549 F.
Supp. 1202, 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[Clourts have viewed experiments outside the jury room as infecting the
deliberations with such extra-record material that the verdict has been rendered constitutionally invalid."); Durr,
442 F. Supp. 487 (new evidentiary fact introduced when jury foreman reenacted the homicide outside of the jury
room and reported the results to his fellow jurors); Brown, 399 N.E.2d 51 (new evidentiary fact created when juror
conducted independent test of visibility, using motor vehicle different from that described in the evidence and
reported results to the jury); with Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 39 P.3d 124; Chamberlain,112 N.M. at 733, 819 P.2d
at 683 (concluding that the jury properly used evidence before it to evaluate conflicting evidence of the truth);
Dascenzo, 30 N.M. 34, 226 P. 1099 (concluding that jury's analysis of the liquor bottle was proper when based
on admitted evidence).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

influence calculated to influence the jury.269 It does so by dispelling any notion that
such reliance is misconduct that would give rise to a presumption of prejudice. As
a result, Mann properly walls off from attack the methods by which the jury
deliberates by categorizing them, instead, as proper internal influences.
The court's decision to protect the integrity of the jury system in such a way is
a principled decision. It not only represents a realignment with a rule that New
Mexico courts have been long willing to apply but is also well supported by
precedent from other state and federal courts, as well as the policies underpinning
our jury system. By focusing onfacts in issue rather than a juror'sknowledge base,
the Mann court strikes a balance between the need to protect the integrity of our
jury system and a party's right to a fair trial. Although this balance tilts back in
favor of the jury system, it is nonetheless a constitutional balance. After Mann, the
ability to invoke Rule 11-606(B) is no different than it was prior to the Sacoman
decision. Mann simply readjusts the balance in favor of the sanctity of the jury
process without balancing away a party's right to due process.
Without Mann, the internal processes by which the jury deliberates would be
subject to a post-trial inquiry under Rule 11-606(B). If the internal processes by
which jurors deliberate can be said to create a presumption of prejudice, then every
challenge to a verdict raised under Rule 11-606(B) would create a duty in the trial
court to investigate the jurors' beliefs, opinions, discussions, and grounds for their
verdict. These are the very internal mental processes that Rule 11-606(B) seeks to
protect from intrusion by rendering a juror incompetent to testify under such a
challenge.27 ° Without Mann, a process intended to be private would instead be the
subject of public scrutiny, deliberations between jurors intended to be open and free
would instead be constrained, and verdicts intended to be final would instead be
open to attack. After Mann, let there be no question regarding the value placed by
the New Mexico Supreme Court on the individual characteristics of each juror.
Hence, when it comes to the jury room, beautiful minds are allowed.

269. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, 27,39 P.3d at 132 (citing Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 732,819 P.2d at 682;
Nichols v. Busse, 503 N.W.2d 173, 186 (Neb. 1993); State v. Anderson, 748 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1985), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shelton, 851 S.W.2d 134 (Tenn. 1993)).
270. See Rule 11-606(B) NMRA 2004.

